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Patent cases at the district court level are one of the most complex,
time-consuming, and contentious forms of civil litigation. As an
alternative to the conventional, two-sided adversarial process, this
Article proposes a structural change to the manner of conducting
patent litigation in the district courts: the addition of a neutral
litigant who, as the "third" side, represents the public interest and
participates alongside the parties in all aspects of the case. Based
on a novel game theoretic model, along with lessons from the
International Trade Commission and the Solicitor General's
amicus practice before the Supreme Court, the presence of the
neutral litigant is expected to decrease the overall level of
contentiousness so as to improve the district court's ability to
adjudicate complex issues in a manner that both advances the
development of the law, and serves the public interest in the fair,
accurate, timely, and efficient resolution ofpatent disputes.
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Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases
1. INTRODUCTION
In every patent case, the public has an interest' in the fair,
accurate, efficient, and just resolution of the dispute in a manner
that strikes the proper balance among the interests of the patentee,
the accused infringer, and the public at large.2 The academic
literature in the patent field is replete with advice to courts on how
to apply' or modify' various rules and doctrines, so as to avoid
results contrary to the public interest. However, patent scholars
'See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945) ("A patent by its very nature is affected with a public
interest.").
2 See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("The balance
between the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding
invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding
monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature
of the federal patent laws since their inception.").
3 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional
Claiming (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2117302, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117302 (arguing for rigorous application of rules
associated with means-plus-function claims); Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents
& Bargaining Breakdown: When Is Declaratory Relief Needed?, 64 SMU L.
REv. 895 (2011) (outlining policy considerations for district courts when
exercising jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act); Janice M. Mueller
& Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law's Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45
Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1103 (2008) ("In this Article we argue that the inherent
anticipation doctrine should be narrowly and sparingly applied."); Dan L. Burk
& Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1668
(2003) (encouraging courts to use various "policy levers" to "tailor the general
legal standards of patent law to the needs of particular industries").
4 See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 379, 384 (2012) ("[W]hile the pioneer doctrine remains among the living,
this Article argues that it should now be interred once and for all."); Christopher
B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty
Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1711 ("In lieu of Georgia-Pacific,
this Article proposes that courts should adopt an alternative standard for
imposing a reasonable royalty. . . ."); John M. Golden, Construing Patent
Claims According to Their "Interpretive Community": A Call for an
Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 328 (2008)
(arguing that courts should "replac[e] the ordinary artisan rule with a rule
declaring the governing perspective of claim construction to be a hybrid one: the
perspective of a patent attorney with access to the technological knowledge of
an ordinary artisan").
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have paid scant attention to the docket management pressures'
faced by district judges, which, separate and apart from any
particular rule or doctrine, may also affect case outcomes by
influencing the timing and manner of adjudication. Docket
management concerns are especially acute in patent litigation, as it
is one of the most contentious forms of civil litigation at the district
court level: 6 It is the only form of complex civil litigation for
which no less than twenty federal judicial districts have found it
necessary to adopt specialized "patent local rules"' governing the
5 A significant constraint on a district court's docket is the Speedy Trial Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2006), which imposes timing requirements in criminal
cases. Cf Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposal for
Procedural Reform in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633,
1672 (1995) ("[Blusy courts, particularly those of the federal system-in which
the demands of the criminal case docket under the Speedy Trial Act are such
that most working days are devoted to criminal, not civil, cases-. . . feel[ ] that
they have literally 'no time to waste' on motions that may not directly resolve
the civil case.").
6 See, e.g., Victor G. Savikas, Survey Lets Judges Render Some Opinions
about the Patent Bar, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 58 (reporting results of
survey with responses from 256 district judges where "[t]hirty-eight percent of
the respondents said that discovery disputes are more prevalent in patent cases
than in other types of civil litigation").
The contentious nature of patent disputes has not gone unnoticed by the
Federal Circuit. "The Rambo Litigator" was the subject of the first panel in the
first plenary session at the Federal Circuit's 1993 Judicial Conference, where the
late Helen Nies, a former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, observed:
In hardball litigation, every request by the other side is opposed with
paper, with briefs, and requests for argument, even a request for a two
day extension of time. Discovery requests are made deliberately
ambiguous and sweeping and no matter what reply is made, there's a
charge of non-compliance. Depositions are scheduled at inconvenient
times and mail is sent by slow boat to shorten the other side's time to
respond. At depositions, there are senseless objections, bickering and
delay and depositions are endless in numbers, whether there's anything
under the next stone or not. Many stones do not have to be turned over.
If a minor motion is lost, there's a demand for sanctions for a frivolous
pleading.
The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 217 (1993).
7 A list of the federal judicial districts that have adopted patent local rules as
of 2012, as well as examples of patent local rules from select districts, are
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content and timing of disclosures in an attempt to make patent
cases more manageable.8
In patent litigation, the parties are often too willing to fight
without regard to the relative importance of an issue or the strength
of the other side's position,' such that protracted discovery
disputes"o and high-volume, overly-aggressive motion practice" are
common. By multiplying the number of issues requiring the
court's attention and presenting highly-polarized arguments that
provide an incomplete, heavily-skewed analysis of the facts and
the law, parties that engage in overly contentious advocacy
complicate the court's already difficult task of adjudicating issues
that are complex both legally and technically.12 Indeed, it is not
available in PETER S. MENELL, LYNN H. PASAHOW, JAMES POOLEY, MATTHEW
D. POWERS, STEVEN C. CARLSON, & JEFFREY G. HOMRIG, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE Appendix D (2d ed. 2012),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2114398.
8 See, e.g., Jessie Seyfer, Patent Judges Buried in Paper, THE RECORDER
(Mar. 5, 2007) ("The Northern District [of California] has actually tried to head
off needless quibbling and confusion for years with its local patent rules ....
The rules set clear timelines for discovery and force each side to state clearly
and early what kind of evidence they want the other side to produce.").
However, the patent local rules themselves have become a source of litigation.
Id. ("These rules have helped, judges say, but[,] as often happens with rules[,]
they've also given attorneys more to fight over.").
9 See, e.g., Seyfer, supra note 8 (" 'The patent bar tends to fight,' said
Magistrate Judge Edward Chen. 'They tend to be . . . quite litigious, maybe
because of the dollars involved. You don't have the limits of the economics of
the case that would typically apply to other civil litigation."').
10 See, e.g., William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of
Law: An Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 324 (2011) (noting that almost all patent litigators who
were surveyed considered "discovery practice in patent cases to be 'a big game,'
... by opposing counsel who seek to prolong discovery battles in an attempt to
wear down the other side or sometimes even get opponents to give up trying to
get certain information due to the extraordinary costs of discovery disputes").
" See, e.g., Seyfer, supra note 8 (" 'If either party becomes contentious, the
other party needs to respond to that,' said Fish & Richardson partner Katherine
Lutton, head of her firm's litigation practice. 'If one side files a 40-page brief
that shoots from the hip, you need to respond to the arguments in it.' ").
12 Kathleen M. O'Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald M. Whyte, A Panel
Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (2004) (statement of Judge Patti Saris) ("Patent
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uncommon for district judges to be led astray by counsel. 3 In
short, unnecessary contentiousness adversely affects the ability of
district courts "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 4
At the same time, the high cost of contentious litigation may
prompt some parties to settle prematurely rather than pursue
meritorious positions that may help establish the proper scope of
patent rights" and contribute to the evolution of case law."
Indeed, the business model of collecting nuisance-value
settlements that is commonly practiced by so-called "patent trolls"
is made viable in large part by the notoriously expensive nature of
patent litigation."
Accordingly, this Article sets forth a proposal for dampening
the high level of contentiousness in district court patent cases in
order to improve the speed and accuracy of adjudication, as well as
to enhance the ability of the trial court to decide issues in a manner
litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it is hard scientifically and it is
hard legally.").
'3 See, e.g., Practitioners and Jurists Exchange Views On Patent Litigation at
Sedona Conference, 65 P.T.C.J. 52 (2002) ("A federal trial judge at the
conference blamed the lawyers in part for not explaining the difficult science
involved in patent cases and for failing to minimize the issues at trial. 'I'm
getting half truths from you,' she charged. 'You know you can trip me up and
get me flipped on appeal,' she added.").
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
15 See Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases (Apr.
17, 2013) 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2252849 (arguing that "adjudication of certain types of
patent cases will promote the public good by eradicating invalid patents").
1 For example, the calculation of damages in patent disputes is one area
where case law development is critically needed. See Stanford Law School,
Patent Institutions Summit: The Federal Circuit/District Court Interface,
YOUTUBE (May 21, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ni9NZo5yWpM
at 1:10:25-1:11:46. The Federal Circuit has signaled a willingness to look at
this matter, provided there are suitable cases from the district courts that tee-up
the issues for appellate review. See id.
1 In 2011, the median cost of patent litigation for cases having: (i) less than
$1 million at risk was $650,000; (ii) $1-$25 million at risk was $2.5 million;
and (iii) more than $25 million at risk was $5 million. LAW PRACTICE MGMT.
CoMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 35 (2011).
238 [VOL.15: 233
Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases
that may help advance the law in a direction that promotes the
public interest. Specifically, this Article proposes adding a third
litigant-in addition to the patentee and the accused infringer-to
district court patent cases: a neutral third party charged with
representing the public interest. This "neutral litigant" would
substantively participate in all major aspects of the case, including
discovery and motion practice, and perhaps even trial and
settlement, and would take positions based on an impartial analysis
of the facts and the law that is informed by public interest
considerations. Notably, the dampening of the parties' tendency to
be contentious is expected to occur indirectly as a collateral effect
of the neutral litigant's participation in the case. That is, the
neutral litigant's presence exerts a moderating influence even
though its purpose is not to police the behavior of the parties, but
rather to participate in the litigation alongside them as a
non-partisan (i.e., having neither a pro- nor anti-patentee agenda)
representative of the public interest.
Because the neutral litigant's positions on any given issue will
be based on a disinterested analysis, its views are likely to be
accorded substantial weight by the judge. As a result, each of the
opposing parties-the patentee and the accused infringer-may
find it necessary as a matter of strategy to pick its battles and take
less extreme positions in order to either gain the neutral litigant's
support on an issue or make its position appear more credible to
the court when it is opposed by the neutral litigant.'" In this
manner, the presence of the neutral litigant is expected to alter the
litigation dynamics between the parties so as to disincentivize the
pursuit of unreasonable positions that engender unnecessary
contentiousness.
To be clear, the neutral litigant's presence is not expected to
eliminate all contentious behavior. Rather, the level of
contentiousness in the case is expected to be lower with the neutral
litigant than it otherwise would be. Decreasing the overall level of
contentiousness in a case may help streamline the number and
variety of issues requiring the court's attention and enhance the
analytical quality of the briefing. This would improve the district
8 See infra Part III.B.
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court's ability to adjudicate complex patent disputes fairly, with
greater accuracy and efficiency, and in a manner that advances the
development of the law in furtherance of the public interest.
In a highly-complex, hotly-contested patent dispute, the
introduction of an additional litigant may appear to be a
counterintuitive means of decreasing the overall level of
contentiousness. However, this comports with the experiences of
the attorneys who litigate patent disputes at the International Trade
Commission ("ITC"), where a staff attorney from the ITC's Office
of Unfair Import Investigations ("OUII") serves in a capacity
similar to the neutral litigant proposed in this Article." Notably,
the beneficial dynamic of a three-sided litigation environment with
a neutral litigant is not endemic to ITC actions. Indeed, it has also
been observed at the appellate level-particularly in the context of
the Solicitor General's amicus practice before the Supreme Court,
where the Solicitor General's participation induces the petitioner
and the respondent to streamline their arguments.2 0 As such, the
neutral litigant proposal may be generally applicable to a variety of
district court cases as a way of decreasing the overall level of
contentiousness and to allow the public interest to be represented
as a standalone entity. For illustrative purposes, however, this
Article focuses on patent cases because the proposal itself is
modeled after the three-sided patent litigation dynamic at the ITC.
Although the staff attorneys at the ITC have been involved in
patent-related actions since the 1970s,21 their role in creating a
litigation dynamic that is different from that of the district courts22
has largely escaped detailed scholarly analysis. This Article fills
that gap by providing a novel, game theoretic model23 of the
'9 See infra Part III.A.
20 See infra Part III.A.
2 The first Section 337 investigation that involved a staff attorney from the
OUII (or its predecessor) was Inv. No. 337-TA-001, In the Matter of Certain
Electronic Pianos, which was instituted in 1972 and terminated in 1976. OUII
337 Investigative History, OFFICE OF UNFAIR IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013), http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsf/56ff5fbca
63b069e852565460078cOae/e725af860b5f4b228525661300746298?OpenDocu
ment.
22 See infra Part III.A.
23 See infra Part III.C.
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dynamics of a district court patent case with a neutral litigant who
represents the public interest, as well as laying out a blueprint for
including such a litigant in current patent cases.24
To be clear, this Article is not calling for the end of zealous
advocacy or the adversarial system. Rather, the problem this
Article addresses is a style of litigation characterized by
unnecessary contentiousness that goes beyond ethical zealous
advocacy. Unfortunately, for many patent litigators, there is no
"zealous" advocacy other than the overzealous variety. 25 Indeed,
the "duty" 26 of zealous advocacy is often invoked as a platitude for
justifying and excusing scorched-earth litigation tactics.27
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II explores the factors
that enable unnecessary contentiousness to flourish in district court
patent litigation. Part III lays out the essential characteristics of the
neutral litigant based on lessons from the ITC as well as the
Solicitor General's amicus practice before the Supreme Court. It
then develops a game theoretic model of how the neutral litigant's
presence may change the litigation dynamics of a case to induce
the parties to adopt a less contentious litigation strategy. Part IV
analyzes the procedural mechanisms for including a neutral litigant
in a case, evaluates the suitability of various entities to serve as a
neutral litigant, and discusses the types of cases for which neutral
litigant participation may be appropriate. Part V addresses certain
general objections and concerns regarding the use of a neutral
litigant, and is followed by a brief Conclusion in Part VI.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 Cf Gallagher, supra note 10, at 324 ("[T]he patent litigators in this study
expressed a firm conviction that ethical lawyering is primarily concerned with
zealously advancing the client's interests, rather than a broader notion of a
lawyer's ethical duties to the legal system ... or even to the concern for a 'just'
resolution in a case.").
26 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (1983) ("A lawyer must
. act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
27 See, e.g., Paul C. Saunders, Whatever Happened To "Zealous Advocacy"?,
245 N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 11, 2011) (noting Illinois Circuit Judge Richard Curry's
observation that " 'Zealous advocacy' is the buzz-word which serves to
legitimize the most outrageous conduct, conduct which regrettably debases the
profession as well as the perpetrator" (citation omitted)).
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II. SOURCES OF UNNECESSARY CONTENTIOUSNESS
To better conceptualize how a neutral litigant could help
decrease the overall level of contentiousness in a patent case, it
may be useful to first consider the circumstances and influences
that may facilitate or promote it.
The conventional tools courts use to impose behavioral
norms-namely, rules and sanctions-are, by themselves,
inadequate to change the litigation dynamics that give rise to
hardball tactics. The Federal Rules, as well as the Patent Local
Rules,28 vest considerable discretion with the court in the
management of individual cases.29 Unfortunately, by leaving room
for discretion,30 the rules invite litigation. And if the stakes are
high enough, even rules that are arguably highly specific in their
requirements"-and are generally not amenable to discretionary
application-may also engender litigation. Accordingly, the
28 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PAT. L.R. (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent.
29 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1961, 1967-68 (2007) ("Case-specific
discretion has been at the heart of the Federal Rules ever since they were first
adopted in 1938. There are two main ways discretion operates: a Federal Rule
might delegate discretion explicitly, or it might facilitate discretion indirectly by
using intentionally vague language that invites flexible interpretation."); N.D.
CAL. PAT. L.R. 1-3 (Dec. 1, 2009) ("The Court may modify the obligations or
deadlines set forth in these Patent Local Rules based on the circumstances of
any particular case. .. .").
30 Discretion is often built into the rules through the use of terms, such as
"good cause" or "reasonable," that signal the need for a case-by-case analysis by
the court, and which leave room for differences of opinion between opposing
parties. In the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, the term "good
cause" appears in approximately two dozen places, while "reasonable" and its
variants appear in almost ninety places.
31 One of the more specific rules in the N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. governs the
disclosure of infringement contentions. N.D. CAL. PAT. L.R. 3-1 (Dec. 1, 2009).
The sufficiency of the patentee's compliance with this Rule, however, is often
hotly-contested. See Seyfer, supra note 8 ("[The Patent Local] rules have
helped, judges say, but, as often happens with rules, they've also given attorneys
more to fight over. For instance, now people dispute whether a side followed the
rules well enough. 'You get disputes of whether there was an adequate amount
of disclosure ..... ).
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introduction of new or modified rules, without more, may be of
limited effectiveness in controlling the level of contentiousness.3 2
Likewise, the availability of sanctions" has not deterred parties
from engaging in discovery misbehavior or taking untenable
positions before the court. This is because courts impose sanctions
rather sparingly,3 4 which leads the parties and their attorneys to
heavily discount them." That sanctions are reserved for only the
most egregious cases may be indicative of the court's limited
ability to reliably detect abuse and craft an appropriate sanction. 6
In addition, the rarity of sanctions may also reflect the court's
desire to discourage parties from filing unmeritorious sanctions
motions as a litigation tactic.37
32 See, e.g., Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 406 (1991) [hereinafter Interim Report]
("[J]udges and lawyers do not favor more rules or regulations to handle civility
problems, since they are perceived to be a major factor contributing to the
decline in litigation courtesy.").
33 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (sanctions for pleading and motion abuses);
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (sanctions for failure to obey pretrial orders), FED. R. Civ.
P. 37 (sanctions for discovery violations); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006)
(sanctions for vexatious multiplication of proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)
(court's contempt power).
34 See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 341 ("A common response from [the]
litigators was that sanctions were so rare they were not considered a credible
threat.").
3 See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 313 (1986) ("[T]he 'present value' of sanctions will be
discounted depending on how likely an attorney believes it to be that a judge
will actually impose sanctions.").
36 See Bone, supra note 29, at 2009. Cf William W. Schwarzer, The Federal
Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 703,
711 (1989) ("It is no answer to say that these [litigation] abuses can be
discouraged and controlled by sanctions. The imposition of sanctions is itself a
vagarious, costly, and time-consuming process that aggravates relations among
the parties and the court and rarely undoes the damage done.").
37 See Byron C. Keeling, A Prescription for Healing the Crisis in
Professionalism: Shifting the Burden of Enforcing Professional Standards of
Conduct, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 31, 47 (1993) ("Hardly cowed by the threat of
judicial sanctions, hardball litigators have learned to use sanctions provisions
affirmatively. For example, hardball litigators practicing in federal court have
learned to deflect attention from their own actions with repeated motions for
Rule 11 sanctions against opposing counsel.").
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Furthermore, rules and sanctions are essentially "spot
treatments" that are invoked and applied episodically, whereas
hyper-contentiousness generally pervades the case as a whole,
assuming several forms and affecting a range of issues. The
various forms of unnecessary contentiousness may include:
protracted discovery battles;" voluminous motion practice;39
inaccurate or incomplete characterizations of the facts or the law;40
and incivility.4 1 In patent litigation, almost every issue in the case
is the subject of highly-contentious advocacy,42 where the parties
often take overly-aggressive, highly-polarized positions that
largely eschew any middle ground, whether it pertains to
procedural matters (e.g., scheduling issues, requirements under the
Patent Local Rules, discovery disputes)43 or the merits (e.g., claim
construction, patent liability issues, remedies).44 In short, contentiousness
is reflected in both the manner of litigation as well as the substance
of the parties' theories and arguments across a variety of issues.
That unnecessary contentiousness within a patent case tends to
be systemic in nature suggests that potential solutions may require
38 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39 Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, 74
A.B.A. J. 78 (Mar. 1988) (observing that one of the characteristics of hardball
lawyering is "[a] hair-trigger willingness to fire off unnecessary motions").
40 Marc R. Lieberman & Richard K. Mahrle, Learned Hand for A Day: The
Rewards of Division One's Pro Tem Program, 33 AZ ATT'Y 37, 39 (June 1997)
(noting that "hardball litigation tactics lawyers hold so dear [include] for
example, conveniently failing to address key issues and authorities,
misconstruing record references").
41 Michael Asimow, Embodiment ofEvil: Law Firms in the Movies, 48 UCLA
L. REv. 1339, 1387 (2001) ("One very prevalent hardball tactic is incivility-
that is, rude, bullying behavior that is designed to intimidate other lawyers or
witnesses.").
42 See Seyfer, supra note 8 ("Attorneys [in patent cases], in their zeal to
protect clients in foggy legal territory, can fight tooth and nail over just about
everything.").
43 See, e.g., id (" 'You get disputes of whether there was an adequate amount
of disclosure [under the Patent Local Rules], and we fight over that,'
[Magistrate] Judge [Edward] Chen said.").
44 See, e.g., id ("At claims construction hearings, where the court interprets
the patent language in dispute, litigators can sometimes be at their most
aggressive, judges say, arguing vehemently about the thinnest shades of
meanings of a patent's terms.").
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changing the dynamics within the environment of the case as a
whole. Apart from the judge and the applicable rules and case law
governing the action, the litigation environment within a case may
be shaped substantially by certain behavioral and situational
factors affecting the parties, and in particular, their attorneys. 45 As
recognized in the academic literature,. high levels of
contentiousness may be fueled by attorney self-interest, 46 namely,
the desire for profit 47 and victory.48  Within a law firm, financial
considerations coupled with the "will to win" may suppress or
discourage more moderate views 49 regarding litigation strategy,
especially where the matter is a high-profile, "bet the company"
45 See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 589, 635 (1985) ("[P]aper churning and procedural shadow-boxing [by
attorneys] suggests a more subtle mixture of adversarial psychology, financial
incentives, and perfectionist anxieties.").
46 Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System
and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1608
(2002) ("Hyper-adversarialism prevails in high-stakes cases . . . because it
serves the pocket books and egos of lawyers.").
47 Rhode, supra note 45, at 635 ("As innumerable commentators have
noted . . . profit dynamics are a major cause of procedural incivilities. ... [M]ost
lawyers will prefer to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, they can
charge by the stone. For an attorney anxious to avoid overlooking details and
underbilling hours, more is always better.").
48 See Schwarzer, supra note 36, at 710 ("Lawyers' behavior in litigation
tends to be dominated by a 'will to win.' Effective and persuasive presentation
of the case has little significance to lawyers independent of winning the
case . . . ."); Rhode, supra note 45, at 635 ("As the level of dispute escalates,
attorneys' own desires for retribution, if not victory, may skew their
decisionmaking.").
49 Cf, Gallagher, supra note 10, at 328 ("[A]lmost all of the interviewed
lawyers were adamant that the grinding need in their firm to meet substantial
billable hours requirements left them little time or ability to spend much time or
intellectual energy worrying about ethics."); Rhode, supra note 45, at 634 ("By
choice or necessity, many lawyers with noncompetitive orientations or strong
commitments to family or nonprofit pursuits drift out of firm hierarchies,
leaving management composed largely of those who accept revenue-maximizing
priorities.").
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case-patent litigation being a prime example"-for which the
client may be less cost-sensitive.'
At the same time, the client's ability to monitor and counteract
his attorney's tendency to over-litigate may be impaired by the
client's relatively limited resources and/or expertise compared to
that of his attorney, as well as the information asymmetry
introduced by protective orders that may prevent the client from
having access to any confidential information produced by the
opposing party during discovery.5 2 As a result, in large, complex
cases, such as patent litigation, the client might rely heavily on his
attorney's characterizations of the relative strength or weakness of
the case, which may be colored by the attorney's self-interest. In
some instances, however, the client may drive the decision to be
contentious, especially when responding to discovery requests. In
such cases, the attorney will likely stonewall the opposing party
rather than press his client to comply with a discovery request-
and risk alienating that client while appearing weak to the other
side."
Indeed, attorneys who engage in hardball tactics often perceive
a need to cultivate a reputation for being tough both as a matter of
strategy and to attract clients.54 If, however, the opposing attorneys
so See John 0. Cunningham, Boston Legal Community Sees Bright Future,
MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Apr. 18, 2005 ("[T]he most sophisticated legal
matters relevant to the largest clients and the 'bet-the-company' matters, such as
patent litigation, will face little or no pricing pressure.").
51 See id.; see also Seyfer, supra note 8 ("'[Patent] cases tend to be very, very
important to the clients and involve lots of money,' said U.S. District Judge
Ronald Whyte. 'So there's perhaps more reluctance to leave any stone
unturned.' ").
52 See Elliott, supra note 35, at 330-31 ("[I]t is unlikely that clients can
accurately assess whether the benefits to the client of additional pretrial
preparation exceed the costs. In-house lawyers generally lack the familiarity
with the details of litigation strategy that would be necessary to second-guess the
recommendations of outside counsel." (emphasis in original)).
s3 See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 338-39.
54 See Peter M. Appleton, Is Winning Everything?: 'Professionalism' Doesn't
Have To Mean 'Doormat,' 62 OR. ST. B. BULL. 21 (2002) ("Litigators with large
well-respected Los Angeles firms agree that firms trade on their reputations as
hardball litigators. In short, lawyers play hardball because, contrary to what we
read, they and their clients believe that hardball works.").
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practice in a limited geographic area-such that they may
encounter each other repeatedly in different cases-then having a
reputation for being overly aggressive could be professionally
disadvantageous." Unfortunately, this is not the case in patent
litigation, where the practice is national in scope56 : The opposing
attorneys are unlikely to encounter each other in the same district
court again, and thus have little incentive to refrain from engaging
in unnecessarily combative tactics in order to develop a productive
working relationship for future cases."
In addition to attorney self-interest, hyper-contentiousness may
also be an artifact of cognitive biases that may prevent attorneys
from accurately gauging the relative strengths of their positions in
relation to those of their opponents. For example, an attorney may
have an inflated view of his abilities, thereby making it difficult for
5 For example, prosecutors and defense attorneys, who tend to practice in a
limited geographic area and/or before a specific court, are known to "get along."
See Barry Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 187 n.154 (1984) ("Defense attorneys are
involved in ongoing relations with prosecutors and judges and become
dependent on their cooperation. Similarly, prosecutors and the court depend on
defense attorneys to cooperate in order to expedite a large volume of cases.");
see also Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 61, 78 n.75
(1993) (collecting sources noting cooperative interactions between prosecutors
and defense attorneys).
56 See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in
Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REv. 335, 347 (2012) ("Patent-litigator practices
are frequently national in scope. In other words, patent litigators do not limit
their practice to the state in which they reside.").
5 Cf John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84
MINN. L. REv. 505, 516 n.53 (2000) ("In legal communities in which counsel
encounter each other (and judges) repeatedly, anecdotal evidence suggests that
'hardball' and discovery disputes are less common. In large cities where
mega-law firms are common and counsel rarely encounter each other (or judges)
repeatedly, confrontational behavior and discovery disputes are more
common.").
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him to recognize the weaknesses in his arguments." Likewise,
"optimism bias" may cause an attorney to underestimate the
likelihood of an adverse ruling. 9 Notably, the mere circumstance
of representing one party against another may be sufficient to skew
an attorney's sense of fairness and adversely affect the accuracy of
his predictions of how the judge is likely to rule."o In addition,
"reactive devaluation," which is the tendency to reflexively
discount or reject the opposing party's positions and proposals,
may also be a factor in promoting unnecessary bickering between
the parties on a range of issues." Clients may also be affected by
these cognitive biases in their decisions to authorize hardball
tactics, which may be aggravated by the informational
disadvantage under which the clients operate.62 In essence,
cognitive biases introduce a mismatch between attorney perception
58 Cf Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How
Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-
Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1127 (1999)
("[I]ncompetent individuals fail to gain insight into their own incompetence by
observing the behavior of other people. Despite seeing the superior performances
of their peers, bottom-quartile participants continued to hold the mistaken
impression that they had performed just fine.").
See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (citing studies showing that "people
are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability that bad things will
happen to them").
60 See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin
Camerer, Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
1337, 1341 (1995) (reporting experimental results and concluding that "[t]here
was a strong tendency toward self-serving judgments of fairness and predictions
of the judge's award when subjects knew their roles").
61 See generally Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict
Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al.
eds., 1995) (defining "reactive devaluation" as "refer[ring] to the fact that the
very offer of a particular proposal or concession-especially if the offer comes
from an adversary-may diminish its apparent value or attractiveness in the
eyes of the recipient" (emphasis in original)); cf Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental
Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 160 (1994) ("[Our] reactive devaluation work
suggests that when an offeror makes a settlement offer, there is a risk that the
offeree will devalue that offer and opt for trial, particularly when she feels some
ill will toward the offeror.").
62 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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and reality, such that attorneys may insist on pursuing weak claims
or defending futile positions until the mismatch is resolved by a
ruling from the court, which, given docket congestion, can take a
while.
Given the influence of attorney self-interest and cognitive
biases on the choice of strategies adopted by the opposing parties,
any proposal for decreasing the level of contentiousness must
account for them in order to be effective. As discussed
previously,63 proposals that call for the court to exercise greater
control over litigation through additional rules and sanctions6 4
could exacerbate the problem by creating satellite litigation. Other
proposals, such as additional training," or the adoption of civility
codes by courts and bar associations," may be limited in their
effectiveness because they focus primarily on the transmission of
knowledge rather than overcoming the influence of attorney
self-interest and cognitive biases that shape attorneys' perceptions
of the desirability of certain tactics. That is, contentious behavior
may be less a function of a lack of knowledge, and more a function
of a lack of motivation to act otherwise.
Accordingly, to counter the influence of attorney self-interest
and cognitive biases that drive hardball tactics, it may be necessary
to change the litigation environment so as to cause the parties to
recalibrate what they perceive to be in their self-interest, as well as
to counteract the parties' cognitive biases by providing a "reality
check" without waiting for the court to issue a ruling. One way to
accomplish this is to add a neutral litigant, which will be described
in greater detail in the next section.
III. LITIGATION DYNAMICS WITH A NEUTRAL LITIGANT
To mitigate or counteract the influence of attorney self-interest
and cognitive biases described in Part II that promote unnecessary
contentiousness, this Article proposes adding an independent,
neutral third party litigant charged with representing the public
63 See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 46, at 1609-14.
65 See, e.g., Interim Report, supra note 32, at 411-13.
66 See, e.g., id. at 414-16.
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interest to district court patent cases. Drawing on lessons from the
International Trade Commission ("ITC") and the Solicitor
General's amicus practice before the Supreme Court, Part III
presents a neutral litigant model, along with a game theoretic
analysis of the litigation dynamics with a neutral litigant.
A. Lessons from the ITC and the Solicitor General
To illustrate the litigation dynamic that is expected to result
with a neutral litigant, the experience of the ITC is particularly
instructive.
The ITC is an independent federal agency that administers U.S.
trade remedy laws,"7 and is authorized to investigate, among other
things, the importation of goods alleged to infringe U.S. patents
under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1337.68 In substance, Section 337 actions largely
resemble district court patent litigation.69 However, a notable
difference is that, in addition to the patentee and the accused
infringer, a staff attorney from the ITC's Office of Unfair Import
Investigations ("OUII") may participate as a neutral, independent
litigant with full party status70 who represents the public interest.7'
The presence of the ITC staff attorney as a neutral third party
litigant creates a litigation dynamic in Section 337 actions that is
67See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, http://www.usitc.gov/
press room/about usitc.htm (last visited May 18, 2012).
68 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006). Section 337 proceedings are governed
by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., the Commission
Procedural Rules, 19 C.F.R. Part 210, and the Ground Rules of the presiding
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Section 337 Investigations at the US.
International Trade Commission: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Pub.
No. 4105 at 1 (2009) [hereinafter Section 337 FAQ], available at
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
69 Section 337 FAQ, supra note 68, at 2.
70 Id. ("The investigative attorney is a full party to the investigation."). The
ITC staff attorney is formally known as the "Commission Investigative
Attorney." 19 C.F.R. § 210.3 (2012). The staff attorney is often referred to
simply as "the Staff."
n MARCIA H. SUNDEEN, JOHN W. BATEMAN, JEFFREY S. GERCHICK & T. CY
WALKER, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC § 2:4, § 12:6 (West 2010).
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different from district court litigation.7 2 As a full party, the ITC
staff attorney may participate in all aspects of the case-discovery,
motion practice, trial, and settlement-alongside the private
parties" in order to ensure that the contested issues are decided in a
fair and reasoned manner, based on a full and complete record,
consistent with the public interest.74 Regarding discovery practice,
the ITC staff attorney may propound discovery, receive discovery
responses, question witnesses at depositions, and participate in
meet-and-confers." However, the ITC staff attorney himself is
generally not subject to discovery by the other parties, given the
staff attorney's special responsibilities and the fact that he is not an
original source of information." When a motion is filed, the ITC
staff attorney may file a response during the briefing period to
express the views of the OUII on an issue-by-issue basis. During
trials, or "hearings" in ITC parlance," the ITC staff attorney may
72 MARK LYON & SARAH PIEPMEIER, ITC SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS at 4 (2011), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/LyonPiepmeier-ITCSec
tion3371nvestigations.pdf ("The typical plaintiff-defendant dynamic is quite
different when a neutral third party is also participating in the litigation ....
[U]nderestimating the Staff's importance and role is a typical and sometimes
costly mistake for new ITC litigants.").
7 See SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 71, at §12:6 ("The [ITC] staff attorneys
will participate in all conferences of the parties, the discovery and motions
practice, and the hearing, and submit post-hearing briefs.").
74 Id. at §2:4, §12:6.
7s See id. at §2:4; PETER S. MENELL, G. BRIAN BUSEY, RUFFIN CORDELL,
MARK G. DAVIS, MATTHEW D. POWERS, & STURGIS M. SOBIN, SECTION 337
PATENT INVESTIGATION MANAGEMENT GUIDE 1-20, 4-22 (2010) [hereinafter
SECTION 337 GUIDE], available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1603330.
76 SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 71, at §4:50 (noting that discovery of the staff
attorney by another party is inappropriate absent a showing that the information
sought is necessary, that its absence would result in prejudice, and that it cannot
be obtained from another source without undue hardship).
n Q & A With T. Spence Chubb of WilmerHale, ITC 337 LAW BLOG (Aug. 27,
2010) [hereinafter Spence Chubb Q&A], http://www.itcblog.com/20100827/q-a-
with-t-spence-chubb-of-wilmerhalc ("[B]ecause OUII takes a position on all of
the issues on an issue by issue basis (down to the level of the individual
elements of a patent claim), OUII's positions are usually not entirely on the side
of one of the private parties or the other, but are instead a 'mixed bag."').
78 In Section 337 actions, the trials are evidentiary hearings that resemble
bench trials in district court litigation. Section 337 FAQ, supra note 68, at 2.
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examine witnesses and submit pre- and post-hearing briefs.79 The
ITC staff attorney may also facilitate settlemento as well as review
proposed settlement agreements to ensure they do not contain
provisions that are contrary to the public interest."' To be clear, the
ITC staff attorney is an actual party to the investigation and is not
a judicial adjunct, such as a special master or a magistrate judge.
As. such, the ITC staff attorney does not engage in any ex parte
communications with either the administrative law judge ("ALJ")
who presides over the action or the ITC Commissioners who
review the AU's decisions.8 2
For the ALJ who presides over a Section 337 action, the ITC
staff attorney's filings often help illuminate the issues from a
disinterested 3 viewpoint, especially on discovery matters84 and
79 See SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 71, at § 12:6.
80 Id. (noting that ITC staff attorney may "serv[e] as an ombudsman to
facilitate a settlement agreement in appropriate cases").
8 MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 GUIDE, supra note 75, at 10-5, 10-6 ("[T]he
OUII will be vigilant to make certain that settlements do not adversely affect the
public by, for example, imposing unlawful pricing restrictions or other
anticompetitive terms.").82 Id. at 1-19.
83 See Charles H. Sanders, Will ITC Staffing Changes Make Future Section
337 Litigation More Like Federal Court?, GOODWIN PROCTOR 2 (Apr. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletter-Articles/
IP-Articles/201 1 04/05 0l.aspx ("[I]n its role of representing the public
interest, the Staff provided parties with a neutral view of the merits before the
parties receive the ALJ's [rulings]."). The ITC staff attorneys do not have a pro-
patent or protectionist agenda. Spence Chubb Q&A, supra note 77 ("It should
be kept in mind that OUII makes a decision on how to argue the merits based
upon how it views the evidence and the law, not based upon any political
considerations or any protectionist or pro-patent leanings.").
84 The ITC staff attorney's views on the parties' discovery motions may be
particularly helpful to the ALJ in light of the ITC staff attorney's ability to
observe the behavior of the parties' attorneys during discovery, which occurs
largely out of the view of the judge. Cf James L. Duncan, Origin, History and
Role of the Office of Unfair Import Investigations, THE 337 REPORTER 25, 26
(2006) ("This staff [attorney] would be the 'eyes and ears of the Commission on
the street,' with the important responsibility of creating a full record so that the
Judges and Commission could make a correct and fully informed decision."
(quoting interview with Arthur Wineburg, former OUII Director (July 2006))).
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dispositive motions." Because the ITC staff attorneys' briefs
contain impartial analyses of the disputed issues, they are deemed
particularly persuasive by the ALJs: According to one study, the
ALJs agreed with the ITC staff attorneys' positions over eighty
percent of the time.86 Because the ITC staff attorney's views carry
considerable weight with the ALJ," the presence of the ITC staff
attorney has been observed to exert a moderating effect on the
parties' manner of litigation: Experienced practitioners consider it
strategically advantageous to maintain credibility with the ITC
staff attorney-often informally vetting their positions on
discovery issues" and potential dispositive motions89 with him-
lest the ITC staff attorney oppose their positions or motions before
the ALJ." That is, the parties perceive a strategic need to "pick
" MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 GUIDE, supra note 75, at 6-7 ("[T]he
independent analysis of the OUII staff attorney ... may be of particular value to
the ultimate decision makers especially if the OUII staff attorney has undertaken
a complex analysis or has pointed to unique policy reasons that warrant a grant
or denial of the motion.").
86 Jerold B. Murphy, A Statistical Comparison of the Staff Attorneys'
Positions on Disputed Issues and the Administrative Law Judges' Decisions on
Such Issues, 21 337 REPORTER 53, 54 (2005) ("The Staff attorney's position and
the Judge's holding was compared on a total of 90 disputed issues from the 7
IDs [initial determinations]. The Judges adopted the Staff attorney's position on
81.3% of the disputed issues.").
87 See, e.g., SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 71, § 12:6 ("As a party without a
stake in the outcome, the staff attorney's position may be quite persuasive.");
LYON & PIEPMEIER, supra note 72, at 4 ("Depending on the ALJ, the Staff can
have a tremendous influence on procedural issues.").
88 Cf Sanders, supra note 83, at 2 ("[T]he Staff typically moderated discovery
disputes, frequently leading to informal resolution.").
89 See MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 GUIDE, supra note 75, at 6-12 ("Nearly
all litigants will reach out to the OUII staff attorney before filing any motion for
summary determination.").
90 Spence Chubb Q&A, supra note 77 ("[W]hile the Judges do not always
agree with OUJI's positions, they . . . always take OUII's positions into serious
consideration... . Thus, being able to convince the assigned OUII staff attorney
of the reasonableness of the client's positions on the issues is generally
perceived as an advantage . . . ."); LYON & PIEPMEIER, supra note 72, at 4 ("It is
important to develop a good working relationship with the Staff and to attempt
to convince them of your positions. . . . More importantly, it can be advantageous
to have the Staff arguing in favor of your position on the merits. This is because
the Staff can often advance policy or public interest arguments that a
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their battles" and refine their positions in light of the ITC staff
attorney's views, which may help decrease the quantity while
increasing the quality of the motions filed, issues raised, and
arguments presented by the parties.
In short, a positive collateral effect of the ITC staff attorney's
presence in Section 337 actions has been that it may induce the
parties to temper their contentiousness as a matter of strategic
necessity, so as to appear credible in order to gain the support of,
or, alternatively, to mitigate any potential damage when opposed
by, the ITC staff attorney on a given issue. Indeed, when the ITC
recently announced that the participation of the ITC staff attorneys
would be limited in future cases because of budget constraints,"
some practitioners surmised that Section 337 actions could take
longer and resemble the more contentious dynamic of district court
litigation.92
In comparing patent litigation in the district courts versus the
ITC, some may question whether the ITC staff attorney's presence
actually gives rise to a collateral moderating effect because ITC
cases appear to be just as hard-fought (if not more so) than district
court cases. ITC cases can be particularly intense because: (1) the
infringement claims tend to be more substantive than those filed in
the district courts because of the detailed pleading required to
complainant or respondent might not credibly be able to make."); G. Brian
Busey, An Introduction to Section 337 and the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 949 PLI/Pat 11, 15 (2008) ("[T]he Staff's views may sometimes be
given greater deference by the ITC ALJs. It is therefore important for a party
also to persuade the Staff of the merits of its positions during the course of an
investigation.").
9i See Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 24363 (May 2, 2011) (to
be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 210); Ryan Davis, OUII To Reduce Role In ITC 337
Cases, LAW360 (May 3, 2011), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/242642/
print?section=ip.
92 See Sanders, supra note 83, at 2 ("Without the Staff's moderating influence
in discovery disputes, litigants might also anticipate increased discovery motion
practice. This could extend proceedings and time to disposition.. . . [L]itigants
should expect ITC litigation . . . to begin to look more like patent litigation in
federal district court.").
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initiate a Section 337 investigation;9 3 (2) the rules governing
discovery in ITC cases tend to be less strict than the Federal
Rules;9 4 and (3) ITC investigations operate on an expedited
timetable compared to district court cases, whereby the ITC
endeavors to complete most investigations within fifteen months."
Given the better "vetting" of infringement claims prior to filing
suit, fewer procedural constraints, and a faster case timetable, the
potential for discovery abuse and aggressive motion practice is
magnified in ITC cases, which are far less likely to settle than
district court cases." Accordingly, the level of contentiousness in
an ITC case without an ITC staff attorney is likely far higher than
that of a district court patent case.
To quantify the collateral moderating effect of the ITC staff
attorney, it is necessary to compare ITC cases that have a staff
attorney with those that do not, rather than comparing an ITC case
with a district court case. As of the time of writing, a meaningful
empirical analysis of the ITC staff attorney's moderating effect
could not be undertaken because every Section 337 investigation
included a staff attorney until mid-2011 7 Now, the ITC staff
attorney participates in only a subset of the investigations initiated
each year." Because the current rate at which Section 337
93 See LYON & PIEPMEIER, supra note 72, at 7 ("A detailed [pre-filing]
investigation is necessary because the ITC is a fact pleading venue and requires
detailed factual allegations, included [sic] detailed claim charts for all patent
claims asserted.").
9" See MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 GuIDE, supra note 75, at 4-3 ("The scope
of discovery before the ITC is generally broader than that before the District
Courts.... Section 337 investigations typically permit not only more discovery
requests but also more and longer depositions.").
95 See Section 337 FAQ, supra note 68, at 23.
96 Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 63, 100
& Table 10 (2008) ("ITC litigants were considerably less likely to settle. While
nearly 70 percent of district court cases settled, only 42 percent of parties to ITC
investigations settled . . . .").




investigations are instituted averages less than a hundred per year,99
several years would need to pass before a sufficient number of
cases without ITC staff attorneys will have terminated so as to
allow a dataset to be created that would enable relevant parameters
to be meaningfully compared and tested for statistical significance.
In the absence of an empirical study, support for the existence of
the ITC staff attorney's collateral moderating effect is grounded in
the well-documented perceptions and "best practices" of ITC
practitioners who perceive a general dampening of contentiousness
driven by the need to gain the endorsement of, or blunt any
objections from, the ITC staff attorney by picking their battles and
informally vetting their positions with him.'o
Despite the procedural differences between the ITC and the
district courts,'o' the moderating effect on the level of
contentiousness that arises incidentally from the presence of the
ITC staff attorney in Section 337 actions might also be achieved in
district court cases with a neutral litigant that is modeled after the
ITC staff attorney. Rather than being endemic to ITC proceedings,
the moderating effect appears to be an artifact of a litigation
environment where each of the opposing parties perceives an
immediate strategic need to obtain the support of, or mitigate
opposition from, a third, neutral party whose disinterested views
are weighed heavily by the judge.
Indeed, a similar moderating dynamic has also been observed
in the context of the Solicitor General's amicus practice before the
Supreme Court. When the Solicitor General files an amicus brief
during the merits stage and participates in oral argument, he is
acting as a neutral litigant in a three-sided litigation environment
along with the petitioner and the respondent. Like the patent
litigators at the ITC who informally vet their positions with the
99 The U.S. International Trade Commission maintains a webpage with
statistics on Section 337 Investigations at http://www.usitc.gov/press room/
337 stats.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). That page includes a link to a
document listing the number of Section 337 Investigations instituted each
calendar year between 1972 through 2012. http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual
property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
'o' See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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ITC staff attorney, seasoned Supreme Court practitioners will
similarly vet their positions with the Solicitor General in the course
of preparing their briefs, which may result in the petitioner and the
respondent streamlining their arguments in light of potential
support or opposition from the Solicitor General. 0 2  That the
petitioner and the respondent may find it necessary, as a matter of
strategy, to present more refined and less extreme positions in light
of the Solicitor General's views reflects the degree to which the
Supreme Court finds the Solicitor General's views persuasive:' 3
When the Solicitor General participates as amicus, he is on the
winning side 70-80% of the time" and has a statistically
significant impact on the outcome for the petitioner and the
respondent.' 5 Like the ITC staff attorney, the Solicitor General's
reputation for objectivity is a key factor in his success as amicus
before the Supreme Court.'06
102 See Patricia A. Millett, "We're Your Government and We're Here to
Help": Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal Government in Supreme
Court Cases, 10 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESs 209, 227 (2009) (noting that meeting
with the Solicitor General will "allow counsel to develop her own briefing
strategy based on insights gained from those discussions and, in particular, will
allow formulation of her brief in a way that either takes advantage of any
support provided by the Solicitor General's position or mitigates the harm
inflicted by it").
103 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor
General's Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1323,
1337 (2010) ("The Solicitor General's established reputation and enhanced
credibility cause justices and their clerks to rely heavily on the Solicitor
General's briefs.").
'0 Id at 1335 & n.55 (collecting studies).
105 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 810 (2000) (conducting
empirical analysis and concluding that "[t]he Solicitor General's amicus briefs
have a statistically significant impact on outcomes (all other variables held
constant) for both the petitioner's and respondent's side"). For example, the
Solicitor General's support increases the petitioner's chances of winning by
approximately 17% on average, whereas the Solicitor General's support for the
respondent decreases the petitioner's chances of winning by approximately 26%
on average. Id. at 803-04.
106 Id. at 818-19 ("Both the Justices themselves and close observers of the
Solicitor General's office attribute the high rate of success to the Solicitor
General's reputation for objectivity in accurately stating the law.").
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B. Essential Characteristics and Effects
Much like the dynamics within a Section 337 action at the ITC
or the Solicitor General's amicus practice before the Supreme
Court,o' the presence of a neutral litigant could similarly improve
the litigation dynamics of a district court case so as to decrease the
overall level of contentiousness. Notably, "playing traffic cop"
need not be a conscious objective of the neutral litigant, whose
specific role would be to represent the public interest. Rather, as
illustrated in the previous section,' the neutral litigant's
moderating influence on the parties' tendency to engage in overly
aggressive litigation is a collateral effect arising from the parties
recalibrating their strategies so as to better align themselves with,
or blunt the impact of any criticisms from, the neutral litigant,
whose disinterested analysis the court may find particularly
persuasive.
The key characteristics of a suitable neutral litigant at the
district court level may be distilled from the relevant
characteristics of the ITC staff attorney,' as follows:
(1) Purpose: The neutral litigant's purpose would be to
represent the public interest in the fair, accurate, efficient, and just
resolution of patent disputes,"o and to contribute to the
development of case law that strikes the proper balance of interests
among the patentee, the accused infringer, and the public at
large."' The impartiality of the neutral litigant is critical to
producing the collateral moderating influence on the parties'
tendency to engage in hyper-aggressive, overly contentious
advocacy." 2 Otherwise, if the neutral litigant is perceived as
having a partisan agenda, the court may discount its views, and the
parties may not perceive a strategic need to moderate their
positions, if the neutral litigant is expected to reliably side with (or
against) one of the parties regardless of the merits.
107 See supra Part III.A.
'osSupra Part III.A.
'09 Supra Part III.A.
"o See SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 71, at §2:4, § 12:6.
1 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
112 See supra Part III.A.
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(2) Relationship with Court and Parties: As an actual
participant in the litigation, the neutral litigant would not have any
ex parte communications with the court, so as to minimize the
danger of the neutral litigant improperly influencing, or being
influenced by, the court."' The parties, however, may communicate
ex parte with the neutral litigant (e.g., to informally vet potential
motions).'14 Absent special reasons, the neutral litigant would be
subject to the same procedural rules that apply to the parties.
(3) Scope of Activities: The neutral litigant would be involved
in the case on a day-to-day basis, participating in discovery, claim
construction, and motion practice in all stages of the litigation (i.e.,
pre-trial, trial, and post-trial) relating to all issues (e.g., procedural
matters, patent liability, and remedies)."' During the discovery
period, the neutral litigant would propound discovery and
participate in depositions, but discovery generally may not be
taken of the neutral litigant itself."' For the claim construction
process and motion practice, the neutral litigant's participation
could take the form of filing responses to the parties' submissions
during the briefing period that set forth its views on an issue-by-
issue basis"' based on an impartial analysis of the facts and the
law, while highlighting any public interest considerations. The
parties should have an opportunity during the briefing period to
respond to the neutral litigant. Based on the preferences of the
district court, the neutral litigant could also participate in bench
trials. The participation of the neutral litigant in jury trials should
be evaluated by the court for potential juror confusion as well as
possible prejudice arising from the considerable weight the jury
might accord the views of a disinterested entity. However, the
neutral litigant could observe the proceedings and participate in the
briefing of any motions the parties file during and after trial.
Finally, the court could allow the neutral litigant to review
" See MENELLET AL., SECTION 337 GUIDE, supra note 75, at 1-19.
14 See id at 6-12.
" See supra text accompanying notes 73-8 1.
116 See SLNDEEN ET AL., supra note 71, at §2:4, §4:50.
" See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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proposed settlement agreements for any adverse impact on the
public interest."'
As discussed previously, the degree to which the parties may
perceive hardball tactics and extreme positions as strategically
desirable or feasible may be a function of the attorneys'
self-interest as well as any misperceptions of the likelihood of
success that may arise from cognitive biases.1' The experiences of
the ITC staff attorney and the Solicitor General's amicus practice
reveal that the presence of a neutral litigant may help redirect and
mitigate the adversarial psychology underlying unnecessary
contentiousness. 2 0 Specifically, the collateral moderating effect
arising from the neutral litigant's presence essentially leverages an
attorney's self-interest in winning (or saving face): The desire to
win (or limit losses) 2 ' may induce attorneys to exercise greater
care in their choice of motions, issues, positions, and arguments in
order to gain the support of, or minimize any disagreements with,
the neutral litigant, whose disinterested assessment of the merits
may be influential with the court.'22 Relatedly, the neutral
litigant's views on an issue would serve as an early "reality check"
during motion practice that may help mitigate the cognitive biases
that underlie the pursuit of unreasonable positions and any
needless escalation of the dispute while the parties are awaiting a
ruling from the court.
Notably, the neutral litigant's collateral moderating effect may
arise in any aspect of the case in which it participates. For
example, during discovery, the neutral litigant's direct knowledge
of the parties' behavior-gained from its day-to-day interaction
with the parties-will inform the positions it takes in response to
the parties' discovery-related motions (e.g., motion to compel,
motion for protective order, motion for sanctions).'2 3 As a result,
appearing credible to and gaining the support of the neutral litigant
on a given discovery issue may become a strategic consideration
"' See MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 GuIDE, supra note 75, at 10-5, 10-6.
119 See supra Part II.
120 See supra Part III.A.
121 See Schwarzer, supra note 36, at 710; Rhode, supra note 45, at 635.
122 See supra Part III.A.
123 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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for the parties during discovery, in case a party needs to file a
discovery motion or oppose one.124 Indeed, the participation of the
neutral litigant may help defuse the "reactive devaluation" that
may occur when parties assess each other's discovery requests: A
party may be less inclined to refuse outright a particular discovery
request if the neutral litigant also expresses interest in the
discovery sought by the other party. 125 In addition, if the client
drives the contentious behavior during discovery (e.g., by refusing
to produce any documents), the attorney might have an easier time
convincing his client to take a more cooperative approach (e.g.,
agreeing to a limited production) by citing the need to appear
credible to the neutral litigant, especially if the neutral litigant is
expected to support the opposing party's motion to compel.
In the context of dispositive motions, the participation of the
neutral litigant in the day-to-day litigation among the parties may
help decrease both the number of motions and the number of issues
that require adjudication, as well as refine the arguments presented
in the briefing.126 The expected streamlining of motion practice
resulting from the neutral litigant's direct participation in the
litigation alongside the patentee and the accused infringer is
illustrated below in Figure 1.
124 A game theoretic model exploring this dynamic in detail is provided infra
Part Ill.C.
125 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; Seyfer, supra note 8; supra
notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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As a participant in the litigation, the neutral litigant would be
provided copies of, or access to, all the materials produced during
discovery, and can therefore provide the court with a disinterested
analysis of the issues that is informed by the full record and goes
beyond the parties' tendentious submissions. As such, the neutral
litigant's views are likely to be accorded substantial weight by the
court, especially if the issue is complex and the parties take
extreme, diametrically-opposed positions when the likely "correct"
answer lies somewhere in-between. The parties may therefore
perceive some strategic value in informally vetting their motions
with the neutral litigant prior to filing and/or taking less polarized,
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between their positions and that of the neutral litigant. And if the
neutral litigant joins one of the parties in opposing the other party's
motion, the other party will likely provide a more substantive
counterargument in its reply (or sur-reply) brief, or even concede a
point, rather than respond with a reflexive dismissal of the
opposing arguments. In this manner, the neutral litigant's
participation may improve the signal-to-noise ratio in motion
practice, thereby enhancing the court's ability to adjudicate issues
accurately and fairly, and produce rulings sooner and with greater
confidence, especially if the judge has limited experience with
patent cases or if the issues are extremely complex.
In addition, the neutral litigant's presence may improve the
court's ability to rely on procedural rules and the threat of
sanctions in managing its docket. The desire to maintain
credibility with the neutral litigant may discourage a party from
taking unreasonable positions on administrative or procedural
issues for purely tactical reasons (e.g., providing insufficient notice
for a deposition or opposing a request for an extension of time). If
a party files a motion for sanctions, the neutral litigant's views-
which will be informed by its first-hand knowledge of the parties'
interactions-may corroborate, provide greater context to, or refute
the allegations in the motion, so that the court will have more
detailed, reliable information for deciding whether a violation
occurred and crafting an appropriate punishment, if necessary.
Some, however, may question the necessity of a neutral
litigant, given that district judges already use a variety of neutral
entities to assist with patent cases: magistrate judges,'2 7 special
masters,128 technical advisors,'29 and court-appointed experts.'3 0
Three of these neutral entities-magistrate judges, special masters,
and technical advisors-are judicial adjuncts who typically work in
127 See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006); FED. R. Civ. P. 72.
128 See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
129 A district court's ability to appoint a technical advisor falls within its
inherent authority. See TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2002). Technical advisors are essentially "law clerks" with
specialized expertise, and do not contribute evidence. See Reilly v. United
States, 863 F.2d 149, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1988).
30 See FED. R. EVID. 706.
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a capacity where they directly assist the district judge with the
process of adjudication by presiding over hearings and issuing
rulings, 3 ' preparing recommendations for adoption by the court,132
and helping the judge understand complex technical subject
matter.' In the context of Figure 1 shown above, magistrate
judges, special masters, and technical advisors operate at the
adjudication stage where motions are decided, rather than at the
litigation stage where they are briefed, such that any influence they
may have on the parties' strategies and the day-to-day litigation
dynamics would be substantially attenuated compared to that of a
neutral litigant.
Although the neutral litigant and the judicial adjuncts may have
the same primary purpose-that is, to help the court decide issues
fairly, accurately, and efficiently-the beneficial effects arising
from the neutral litigant's participation in the case occurs
"upstream" in relation to the judicial adjuncts. In particular, the
collateral moderating effect of the neutral litigant's presence may
help decrease the number of motions, narrow the issues, and focus
the arguments that are eventually presented to the judge or a
judicial adjunct. For example, discovery usually occurs outside the
presence of the court-as well as the judicial adjuncts-such that a
festering discovery dispute might come to the attention of a
judicial adjunct only when a motion is filed. In contrast, a neutral
litigant has opportunities to observe and engage with the parties on
day-to-day discovery matters, which, as described previously, may
create a dynamic that results in fewer discovery motions being
filed.'3 4 Likewise, in the context of overly-aggressive motion
131 This is a common function of magistrate judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(2006).
132 See, e.g., JAY P. KESAN & GWENDOLYN G. BALL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A
STUDY OF THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF SPECIAL MASTERS IN PATENT CASES 7
(2009) (describing function of special masters as including preparing report or
recommendation for court and also presiding over hearings).
133 See, e.g., Joshua R. Nightingale, An Empirical Study on the Use of
Technical Advisors in Patent Cases, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 400,
414-15 (2011) ("[I]t is nearly universally agreed that a technical advisor's
utmost duty lies in educating the judge about the complex technological and
scientific principles of a case.").
134 See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.
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practice, a judicial adjunct typically gets involved after the briefing
is complete, whereas a neutral litigant would be involved in the
briefing process itself, and might also have informally vetted the
parties' positions before the motion was filed, such that the issues
and arguments ultimately presented in the parties' briefs-for
review by the district judge or a judicial adjunct upon completion
of the briefing period-are likely to be more streamlined.'"
The fourth neutral entity, the court-appointed expert under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706, does not operate strictly at the
adjudication stage because he may be subject to discovery and
cross-examination at trial regarding his expert findings relating to a
particular subject.' 6  Because the court-appointed expert's
disinterested findings may carry considerable weight with the
judge or a jury, the court-appointed expert could have a
moderating effect on the parties and their experts if they find it
strategically necessary to narrow the gap between their positions
and the findings of the court-appointed expert when preparing for
trial.3 7 However, one or both parties will invariably have concerns
about the evidentiary record containing any findings of the court-
appointed expert that they perceive as flawed or otherwise
irreconcilable with the findings of their own experts. As a result,
any moderating effect from the court-appointed expert will be
offset by the additional motion practice and satellite litigation by
those parties who seek to exclude the court-appointed expert's
findings or testimony from consideration by the trier of fact.
"3 See supra Part III.A.
136 FED. R. EvID. 706.
'3 See JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 3-16 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, CIVIL
§ 16.36[3][h][ii] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed.) ("In some cases, appointing a neutral
expert could contribute substantially to pretrial efficiencies by . .. reducing the
adversarial nature of the proceedings, and potentially identifying, clarifying, and
narrowing disputed issues.").
138 See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA, ECF
No. 891 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012) (order on Daubert motions from Oracle and
Google seeking to exclude certain portions of report of court-appointed expert);
Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. 02 Micro Int'l Ltd., No. 4:04-cv-02000-CW,




C. The Neutral Litigant and Discovery: A Game Theoretic Model
Because discovery abuse is considered a particularly
intractable and pervasive form of unnecessary contentiousness,'3 9 it
is worth evaluating the potential impact of the neutral litigant in
the discovery context in greater detail. Specifically, the litigation
dynamics with a neutral litigant may be analyzed with a game
theoretic model that illustrates the degree to which the neutral
litigant's presence may discourage the parties from taking
unreasonable positions and using hardball tactics.
The dynamics of pre-trial civil litigation, and discovery in
particular, are often analogized in the scholarly literature to the
"Prisoner's Dilemma:" 40 Given the option -to behave either
cooperatively (i.e., being reasonable) or noncooperatively (i.e.,
being contentious) during discovery, both parties will engage in
noncooperative behavior in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage
and to avoid getting taken advantage of by the other side, even
though mutual cooperation would provide a more efficient
outcome for both parties. 4 ' For purposes of analyzing the
' In a survey conducted by the Seventh Circuit in the early 1990s, "94% [of
the practitioners who observed civility problems] target discovery as the primary
setting for uncivil conduct." Interim Report, supra note 32, at 380.
140 See, e.g., John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 569,
586 (1989) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain a number of
measures that are consistent with an acknowledgement that the practice of
discovery presents litigants with a Prisoner's Dilemma."); see also Robert W.
Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 709, 718 (1998) ("[L]itigation practice is a
classic prisoner's dilemma: in many cases both sides would gain more from
cooperation, but each stands to lose if he or she cooperates and the other side
doesn't.").
141 See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to
Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal ofIncivility in the Practice of Law,
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 49 (2011) ("[T]he non-cooperative,
autonomous move generally provides the safest chance of winning [in a
Prisoner's Dilemma]. This perspective would not only justify the uncivil
conduct, but it would also dictate that the proper response to incivility is further
incivility. A civil response to an uncivil move would both look weak and be
weak."); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
509, 514 (1994) ("In many disputes, each litigant may feel compelled to make a
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Prisoner's Dilemma model of discovery, "noncooperative"
behavior may include: insisting on pursuing overly broad
discovery; unreasonably delaying or refusing production of
responsive discovery and deposition witnesses; creating
administrative or scheduling disputes for tactical reasons; making
speaking objections, coaching witnesses, improperly instructing
witnesses not to answer, and bullying opposing counsel during
depositions; failing to "meet and confer"l4 2 in good faith; and
needlessly escalating disputes by filing multiple discovery
motions.
The payoffs for each party in the Prisoner's Dilemma model of
discovery, as a function of executing either a cooperative strategy







Where: B > A > Z> S
contentious move either to exploit, or to avoid exploitation by, the other side.
Yet, the combination of contentious moves by both results in a less efficient
outcome than if the litigants had been able to cooperate.").
142 The local rules of some district courts require parties to meet in person or
by telephone and confer about the substance of a motion prior to filing it. See,




Figure 2a lists exemplary payoffs, whereas Figure 2b provides
an abstract representation of the relative numerical relationships
that satisfy the conditions of a Prisoner's Dilemma. Each cell in
the matrix of Figure 2a shows a pair of numbers representing the
respective payoffs of each party for a given strategy against the
other party's strategy. The left number in each pair represents the
plaintiffs (TI) payoff, whereas the right number represents the
defendant's (A) payoff. The payoffs in Figure 2a are as follows:
(i) If both parties cooperate, then both parties benefit such
that the payoff for each party is 1.
(ii) If one party cooperates while the other does not, then the
noncooperating party receives a benefit at the expense of the
cooperating party, such that the respective payoffs for the
noncooperative and cooperative parties are 2 and -1,
respectively.
(iii) If both parties refuse to cooperate, then neither party
benefits such that the payoff for each party is 0.
Given the payoffs in Figure 2a, the strategy of being
noncooperative during discovery is the best response for each party
to the other party's strategy, regardless of which strategy the other
party employs. This conclusion is visually represented in Figure
2c. Specifically, when the defendant acts noncooperatively, the
plaintiffs best response is to act noncooperatively as well because
the plaintiff's payoff for being noncooperative (0) is higher than its
payoff for being cooperative (-1). For visual clarity, the payoff for
the plaintiffs best response is denoted by a single underline.
Similarly, when the defendant is cooperative, the plaintiffs best
response, again, is to be noncooperative because the payoff for
noncooperation (2) is higher than that of cooperation (1).
Likewise, an analysis of the defendant's best responses to the
plaintiffs strategies reveals that being noncooperative yields a
higher payoff for the defendant regardless of which strategy the
plaintiff chooses. For visual clarity, the payoffs for the defendant's
best responses are denoted with double underlining.
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Figure 2c: Figure 2a Annotated with Best Response Payoffs
(Single Underline: Plaintiff; Double Underline: Defendant)
Noncooperative 0,0 2,-1
Cooperative -1,2 1,l
As shown in Figure 2c, mutual noncooperation is the only
strategy pair in which each party is playing its best response
against the other party, in which neither party has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its chosen strategy. In game theory
parlance, mutual noncooperation is the "Nash equilibrium"'43 in the
Prisoner's Dilemma model of the discovery payoff matrix.
(Notation-wise, the Nash equilibria in the payoff matrices in this
Article will be identifiable whenever both payoff values in a
strategy pair contain underlining as a result of having been
identified as best responses, such as 0,0 in Figure 2c.) Although it
is possible that some parties might start out cooperating at the
beginning of the litigation, their interactions will likely degenerate
to an equilibrium of mutual noncooperation as soon as one of the
parties acts, or is perceived to act, contentiously.'" Likewise, the
143 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 22 (1994) ("In a two-person game, a pair of strategies
will form a Nash equilibrium when each player cannot do better given the
strategy the other player has adopted. A Nash equilibrium, in other words, is a
pair of strategies such that each is a best response to the other.").
144 This is the "grim trigger" strategy for iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
See ROGER A. MCCAIN, GAME THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 99 (2009) (defining
"grim trigger" as "[a] rule that plays cooperatively until the other player initiates
non-cooperative play and then retaliates by playing non-cooperatively on all
successive plays").
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meta-strategy of "tit for tat" for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,
which involves a pattern of punishment and forgiveness that may
allow the parties to return to mutual cooperation,'4 5 is unlikely to
be sustained in the typical patent case where the stakes are high
and the opposing attorneys and parties are unlikely to encounter
each other in future litigation, such that they have little incentive to
"forgive"-and risk getting taken advantage of-for a chance at
mutual cooperation.'46
That mutual noncooperation is the Nash equilibrium in the
Prisoner's Dilemma version of discovery is attributable to two
relationships in the payoff matrix, as expressed in terms of the
variables in Figure 2b:
* B > A: The "bastard's payoff," B, which is the payoff for
being noncooperative when the other side is cooperating, is higher
than the payoff for mutual cooperation, A; and
* S < Z: The "saint's payoff," S, which is the payoff for
cooperating when the other side is uncooperative, is lower than the
payoff for mutual noncooperation, Z.
Assuming that the payoff for mutual cooperation, A, is greater
than the payoff for mutual noncooperation, Z,'47 the relationships
listed above define the critical conditions necessary for
noncooperation to be the strictly dominant strategy in the
discovery payoff matrix.
In order to change the relative payoffs in the discovery strategy
matrix so that one or both of the critical conditions (i.e., B > A and
S < Z) that establish mutual noncooperation as the Nash equilibrium
are no longer satisfied, one option may be to change the
environment in which the parties litigate so as to affect the
desirability of a particular strategy. For example, consider the
145 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984)
(characterizing "tit for tat" as "[a] combination of being nice, retaliatory,
forgiving, and clear" where "forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation").
146 See, e.g., Beckerman, supra note 57, at 516 ("[T]he meta-strategy of 'tit for
tat' or reciprocity is more likely to be successful when the players encounter
each other repeatedly, but less likely to be successful when they do not."); see
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
147 This assumption applies to all the payoff matrices analyzed in this Article.
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difference in the behavior of the parties when examining a witness
in the following scenarios: (a) at a deposition during discovery;
and (b) in front of a jury during trial. In both scenarios, there is a
witness who is being asked questions under oath by one party
while another party makes objections from time to time, and a
court reporter transcribes the proceeding. Despite these
operational similarities, however, depositions commonly involve
contentious behavior (e.g., objecting improperly and
unnecessarily),' 48 whereas during trial, seasoned practitioners avoid
contentiousness while in the courtroom (e.g., objecting sparingly)
in order to appear credible and likeable to the jury.'4 9 This disparity
in the desirability of contentiousness as a strategy appears to be a
function of the litigation environment in which the action occurs:
Unlike trials, depositions-like most of discovery-occur without
the presence of a third party monitor whose views may affect the
outcome of the case.'15 In other words, during discovery, there is
148 See Interim Report, supra note 32, at 388 ("Depositions, conducted by
lawyers without direct judicial supervision, can be one of the most uncivil
phases of trial practice."); Eric B. Miller, Note, Lawyers Gone Wild: Are
Depositions Still a "Civil" Procedure?, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1527 (2010) ("Vulgar
and abusive language, witness coaching, 'speaking' objections and improper
instructions not to answer, and even physical violence have been known to occur
[during depositions] . . . . These problems arise from the reality that depositions
are rarely supervised and largely unregulated.").
14 See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE
265 (3d ed. 2004) ("In a well-prepared trial involving experienced counsel it
would not be surprising for hours, even days, to go by without a single
objection. When objections are made they are directed at important items of
evidence whose admissibility is seriously in doubt."); Stanley L. Brodsky &
David E. Cannon, Ingratiation in the Courtroom and in the Voir Dire Process:
When More is Not Better, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 107 (2006)
("[A]ttomeys engage in both subtle and obvious efforts to make their clients and
themselves more likable to the jurors."); Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy:
Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the
Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 488 (1987) ("The goal of courtroom style
techniques aimed at enhancing attorney credibility is to influence how jurors
perceive the evidence. Attorneys can have this influence because jurors tend to
evaluate evidence in light of the credibility of the attorneys presenting or
attacking that evidence.").
'5o See Interim Report, supra note 32; see also DF Activities Corp. v. Brown,
851 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) ("[B]eing deposed is scarcely less
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no third party audience whose real-time impressions of the parties'
actions are of sufficient concern to the parties so as to prompt them
to moderate their behavior.
Accordingly, it is expected that, as the third party monitor's
influence over case outcomes increases, the strategic value of
noncooperation decreases in light of the credibility gains available
with a cooperative strategy. The most extreme case of a third party
monitor's influence on case outcomes is a jury trial, where the
third party monitor is the jury and the judge, who, together, play a
direct role in determining the outcome of the trial. Indeed,
consistent with the preferred practice of seasoned trial
practitioners,"' mutual cooperation is the Nash equilibrium when
the parties litigate in front of a jury, as shown in the payoff matrix
below:










unpleasant than being cross-examined-indeed, often it is more unpleasant,
because the examining lawyer is not inhibited by the presence of a judge or jury
who might resent hectoring tactics. The transcripts of depositions are often very
ugly documents.").
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During a jury trial, noncooperative behavior includes objecting
frequently and being rude to witnesses and opposing counsel,
whereas cooperative behavior includes objecting sparingly and
being civil to witnesses and opposing counsel. As shown in
Figures 3a and 3b, the "saint's payoff," S, is the highest value in
the jury trial strategy payoff matrix because the contrast in the
behavior of the cooperative "saint" and the noncooperative
"bastard" in front of the jury confers a substantial strategic
advantage on the "saint" by making him appear more confident,
credible, and likable by comparison. Conversely, the "bastard's
payoff," B, is the lowest value in the jury trial strategy payoff
matrix because the negative contrast with the "saint" poses a
substantial handicap to winning over the jury. As a result, as
indicated in Figure 3a by underlining, adopting a cooperative
strategy is the best response for each party regardless of the actions
of the other party, thereby rendering mutual cooperation the Nash
equilibrium in the courtroom during a jury trial.
From the jury trial strategy payoff matrix, we see that the
conditions necessary to sustain mutual cooperation as the Nash
equilibrium are:
* B < A: The "bastard's payoff," B, is less than the payoff for
mutual cooperation, A; and
* S > Z: The "saint's payoff," S, is greater than the payoff for
mutual noncooperation, Z.
Notably, the above two relationships constitute the reverse of
the two corresponding relationships associated with the Prisoner's
Dilemma version of the discovery payoff matrix, in which mutual
noncooperation is the Nash equilibrium, as summarized below:
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Table 1: Comparison of Nash Equilibria: Discovery vs. Jury Trial
Discovery Strategy Payoff Matrix Jury Trial Strategy Payoff Matrix
Nash Eq.: Noncooperation Nash Eq.: Cooperation
Conditions: Conditions:
B > A : "bastard's payoff' B < A : "bastard's payoff'
higher than payoff for lower than payoff for
mutual cooperation mutual cooperation
S < Z : "saint's payoff' S > Z : "saint's payoff'
lower than payoff for higher than payoff for
mutual noncooperation mutual noncooperation
The comparison of the Nash equilibria in Table 1 suggests that,
at one extreme, mutual noncooperation is the equilibrium state
where litigation occurs in the absence of a third party monitor (as
in discovery). At the other extreme, cooperation is the equilibrium
state when litigation occurs in the presence of a third party monitor
who controls the outcome of the litigation (as in a jury trial).
Accordingly, the presence of a third party monitor in the form of a
neutral litigant, whose views do not control the outcome of the
litigation but carry some weight with the court, is likely to have an
effect on the discovery payoff matrix that falls somewhere between
these two extremes.
In general, the neutral litigant's presence during discovery is
expected to increase the payoff for cooperative behavior and
decrease the payoff for noncooperative behavior as a result of a
party's gain or loss, respectively, of credibility with the neutral
litigant. These changes to the payoffs are expected, in turn, to
modify the two relationships responsible for establishing
noncooperation as the Nash equilibrium (i.e., B > A and S < Z), so
that noncooperation may no longer be the strictly dominant
strategy.
With respect to the relationship between the "bastard's payoff'
and mutual cooperation (i.e., B > A), the presence of the neutral
litigant is unlikely to reverse this relationship. This is because the
combined effect of a decrease in B from a loss of credibility and an
incremental increase in A from a gain in credibility is not expected
274 [VOL.15: 233
Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases
to be large enough to eliminate the perceived strategic edge
attained by unilateral noncooperation. That is, in the presence of a
neutral litigant-who, unlike the judge or the jury, does not
directly control case outcomes-a party may still perceive the
consequences of unilateral noncooperation as tactically more
desirable than the consequences of mutual cooperation. However,
the loss of credibility associated with unilateral noncooperation
will decrease the margin by which B is greater than A.
In contrast, the neutral litigant's presence is expected to reverse
the relationship between the "saint's payoff," S, and the payoff for
mutual noncooperation, Z, so that S > Z. Specifically, S is
expected to substantially increase because of the credibility gains
from unilateral cooperation and the potential support available
from the neutral litigant in the event a discovery motion may need
to be filed against the noncooperating party. At the same time, Z,
which is the payoff for the unproductive stalemate resulting from
mutual noncooperation, is expected to be lower than S because the
loss of credibility from engaging in mutual noncooperation-and
the potential lack of support from the neutral litigant-may make it
more difficult to successfully compel discovery or seek a
protective order. In short, the presence of the neutral litigant is
expected to make unilateral cooperation less risky and more
beneficial for a party than engaging in mutual noncooperation.
In essence, the critical relationship that distinguishes a
discovery strategy payoff matrix with a neutral litigant from the
Prisoner's Dilemma model is that the "saint's payoff' for unilateral
cooperation is higher than the payoff for mutual noncooperation
(i.e., S > Z). This does not mean, however, that there will never be
mutual noncooperation. Because the "bastard's payoff' will still
be higher than the payoff for mutual cooperation (i.e., B > A),
there will be instances where both parties will end up in a state of
mutual noncooperation while both are attempting to gain the
"bastard's payoff." Accordingly, the equilibrium state will include
a mixture of strategy pairings, as will be explained in reference to
Figures 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b.
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Figure 4a: Discovery Figure 4b: Discovery
Strategy Payoff Matrix Strategy Payoff Matrix
with Neutral Litigant with Neutral Litigant
(Exemplary Values) (Abstract Values)
Noncooperative 0,0 2AQ5 Noncooperative Zrn,ZA Bn,SA
Cooperative 0.5 2 1 1 Cooperative SrH,BA Arn,AA
Where: B >A>S>Z
The discovery payoff matrix of Figures 4a and 4b, in which the
payoffs reflect the presence of the neutral litigant, is a type of
game called "Hawk-Dove" or "Chicken," in which there are three
Nash equilibria: two "pure-strategy" equilibria and one "mixed-
strategy" equilibrium. 2 To determine which equilibria among the
three is the most plausible (i.e., likely to occur in practice),"' each
will be analyzed in turn.
The two pure-strategy equilibria are denoted by underlining in
Figure 4a, which are complementary strategy pairs in which one
party cooperates while the other does not. The existence of
multiple pure-strategy equilibria presents a coordination problem,
which could be solved if the parties were to agree on one of the
equilibrium states or were otherwise aware of the other party's
chosen strategy before acting.' However, there is no single pure-
152 See SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKlS, GAME THEORY: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 198 (1995); BAIRD ET AL., supra note 143, at 44.
's3 Cf BAIRD ET AL., supra note 143, at 39 ("If there are ways to identify the
one Nash equilibrium that individuals are likely to play and others that they are
not, we may still be able to take advantage of the Nash equilibrium concept even
when a game has multiple Nash equilibria.").
15 4 See id. at 40-41.
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strategy equilibrium in Figure 4a that will be preferred by both
parties or otherwise emerge as a likely focal point because the
payoffs for the two equilibria are asymmetric, i.e., (2,0.5) and
(0.5,2), with identical combined totals, i.e., 2.5.' More importantly,
because the parties are adversarial, each will endeavor to keep the
other party guessing about its next move and will likely resist any
coordination of strategies.'5 ' Accordingly, the two pure-strategy
equilibria may not serve as useful models for our analysis because
it may not be possible to predict which of the two pure-strategy
equilibrium states will occur,"' and solving the coordination
problem may require a level of information exchange between the
parties that is unrealistic in practice.
Fortunately, there is a third Nash equilibrium that may provide
a more realistic model of the parties' behavior. In this third
equilibrium, each party mixes its strategies by cooperating some
portion of the time while not cooperating at other times. Because
the parties are adversarial, we can assume that the mixing is not
coordinated between the parties, and appears random from the
point of view of the other party."' Accordingly, the respective
portion of the time when a party adopts a particular strategy (i.e.,
cooperation or noncooperation) may be expressed as a probabilistic
weight, which is a function of the payoffs.'59 As a result, in this
"mixed-strategy" equilibrium, each of the four strategy pairs in the
discovery payoff matrix is expected to occur during a case for a
specific portion of the time.
For use in calculating the probabilistic weights of the parties'
strategies in a "mixed-strategy" Nash equilibrium, Figure 5a
reproduces Figure 4b with variables representing the probability
See id at 44.
Cf id. at 40-41.
1 See HARGREAVES HEAP ET AL., supra note 152, at 70-72; BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 143, at 44.
58 Cf HARGREAVES HEAP ET AL., supra note 152, at 70-72. By way of
illustration, mixing one's strategies in a way that appears random and
unpredictable to the opponent is common in certain sports and games, e.g.,
tennis shots, baseball pitches, penalty kicks in soccer, bluffing in poker, etc. See
id at 71 (Box 2.4).
1' See id at 72-73.
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weights for each of the parties' choice of strategies: p and i-p
correspond to the probability weights denoting the portion of the
time during a case when the plaintiff will be noncooperative or
cooperative, respectively, whereas d and 1-d correspond to the
probability weights denoting the portion of the time during a case
when the defendant will be noncooperative or cooperative,
respectively. Because the parties are mixing their strategies
according to the probabilistic weights, all four strategy pairs will
exist in the proportions specified in Figure 5b.













Where: B>A>S>Z;O<p< I ; 0<d< I
In a "mixed-strategy" equilibrium, the expected payoff of each
component strategy within a party's mix of strategies must be the
same.16 0  Specifically, given that the plaintiff is mixing its
strategies with probabilities p and 1-p, the defendant's expected
payoff in equilibrium from adopting a noncooperative strategy
must be equal to its expected payoff from adopting a cooperative
160 See id
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strategy against the plaintiff, which may be expressed algebraically
as:
ZAp + BA(1-p) = SAP + AA(1-p)
(A's Expected Payoff (A's Expected Payoff
from Noncooperation) from Cooperation)
Similarly, given that the defendant is mixing its strategies with
probabilities d and 1-d, the plaintiffs expected payoff in
equilibrium from adopting a noncooperative strategy must be equal
to its expected payoff from adopting a cooperative strategy:
Znd + Bn(l-d) = Snd + An(1-d)
(H's Expected Payoff (H's Expected Payoff
from Noncooperation) from Cooperation)
After simple algebraic operations, the following expressions
may be obtained for p and d, which are the respective portions of
the plaintiffs and defendant's strategy mixes where they behave
noncooperatively:
p= (BA- AA) /(SA- ZA+BA 
- AA)
d= (Bn- An) /(Sn- Zn+Bn - An)
To streamline the above expressions for p and d, we can
substitute ABA for B-A and Asz for S-Z to arrive at the following
expressions (the additional bracketed subscripts, [H] and [A],
denote which parties' payoffs (plaintiffs or defendant's) are being
used in the calculation):
p = ABA[A] (Asz[A] + ABA[A]) (Eq. 1)
d = ABA[n] (Asz[n] + ABA[H]) (Eq. 2)
Notably, the streamlined expressions for p and d make it clear
that the probability weights denoting the proportion of the time that
a party will be noncooperative in a "mixed-strategy" equilibrium is
a function of the other party's payoffs. In the context of litigation,
one possible interpretation of this result is that a party will
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calibrate the need to be contentious based on the observed
tendencies of the other party. Take Eq. 1, for example: If the
defendant tends to overvalue its "bastard's payoff' for unilateral
noncooperation such that ABA[A] is large or undervalues the "saint's
payoff' for unilateral cooperation such that Asz[A] is small, then the
defendant will behave in a manner such that the proportion of the
time, p, that the plaintiff will perceive the need to employ a
noncooperative strategy against the defendant will be high.
Conversely, if the defendant's preferences were the opposite, i.e.,
ABA[A] is small and/or Asz[A] is large, then the proportion of the
time that the plaintiff would find it necessary to act
noncooperatively would be lower.
The values for ABA and Asz would be established early in the
case when the parties, along with the neutral litigant, are getting
acquainted with each other's litigation styles.'6 ' The values for
ABA and Asz, and consequently, p and d, which govern the
probabilistic mix of strategies used by the parties, are expected to
remain stable throughout the case in the absence of a substantial
change in the litigation environment, such as a change in counsel
by one of the parties or the removal of the neutral litigant. The
values of ABA and Asz in a given case may depend on, among other
things: the personalities, group dynamics, and firm culture of the
attorneys (and their clients); the degree to which the neutral litigant
is active in the litigation and is able to redirect and mitigate the
effects of attorney self-interest and cognitive biases; and the
amount of weight that the judge tends to give the neutral litigant's
views.
To see how a "mixed-strategy" equilibrium works with actual
values, Figure 6a specifies the probability weights for each party's
strategy for the matrix of Figure 4a, and Figure 6b provides the
probability of occurrence for each of the four strategy-pairs:
16' As mentioned previously, patent litigation tends to be a national practice,
such that the opposing attorneys are unlikely to have encountered each other in
prior litigation before the same judge. See Schwartz, supra note 56, at 347.
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Figure 6b: Distribution ofFigure 6a: Figure 4a withStaeyPisnMxdProbability Weights Strategy Pairs in Mixed
Strategy Equilibrium
A A
Noncooperative 0,0 2,0.5 2/3 Noncooperative 4/9 2/9
Cooperative 0.5,2 1,1 1/3 Cooperative 2/9 1/9
Probability 2/3 113
Figure 6a shows that the plaintiff will be mixing its strategies
in equilibrium such that it will be noncooperative 2/3 of the time
and cooperative 1/3 of the time. The defendant's strategy mix
happens to be identical in this example because the matrix is
symmetrical. Given the probability weights for each strategy in
Figure 6a, Figure 6b shows the expected distribution of strategy
pairings that will occur during litigation: 4/9 of the time, there will
be mutual noncooperation; 2/9 of the time, the plaintiff will
cooperate while the defendant will not; 2/9 of the time the
defendant will cooperate while the plaintiff will not; and 1/9 of the
time, there will be mutual cooperation.
In summary, the "mixed-strategy" Nash equilibrium analysis
yields an intuitive model that captures the litigation dynamics with
a neutral litigant, whose presence converts discovery from a
Prisoner's Dilemma, where noncooperation is the sole optimal
strategy, to a different strategic environment where the optimal
strategy involves a mix of noncooperation and cooperation.
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IV. MECHANISM FOR NEUTRAL LITIGANT PARTICIPATION
Part IV analyzes how the neutral litigant described in Part III
may be implemented under existing rules and case law. The
procedural options are presented, followed by an evaluation of the
type of entity that may be suitable for acting in the capacity of a
neutral litigant who represents the public interest, and a description
of the types of cases that would make best use of this additional
litigant.
A. Procedural Issues
There are two procedural options by which a court could
potentially accommodate a neutral litigant who represents the
public interest in a patent case: intervention and the "litigating
amicus" device. Of the two, the "litigating amicus" device may be
a viable option in most cases, whereas intervention may be
possible only in very limited circumstances and for a limited
purpose.
In the absence of any statutory authority that grants the
proposed neutral litigant an unconditional right to intervene'6 2 in a
given patent case, intervention as of right' is unlikely to be
available because the neutral litigant's purpose is not to defend "an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of
the action"'"-where the "interest" must be "direct, substantial,
and legally protectable"'"-but rather to ensure that the merits of
the case are fully and fairly analyzed in light of the public interest.
Although some circuits might apply a looser "interest" requirement
in public law cases,' patent suits are not presently recognized as a
form of "public law" litigation.'
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).
163 Id. at 24(a).
6 Id. at 24(a)(2).
165 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 6-24 supra note 137, § 24.03[2][a].
166 Id. at § 24.03[2][c].
167 Cf Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 41, 46 (2012) (challenging conventional view treating disputes over patent
validity as private law litigation). Unlike private law litigation, which focuses
on redressing disputes between private parties, public law litigation seeks to
vindicate the public interest. See id. at 47-49.
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As for permissive intervention,'68 the neutral litigant might be
able to satisfy the requirements under limited circumstances,
especially if it is a government agency. Generally, a movant
requesting permissive intervention must have either a conditional
right to intervene by statute'69 or a claim involving a common
question of law or fact with the action.'" If, however, the movant
is a government agency, the court may allow intervention if a
party's claims or defenses involve a statute or a rule administered
by that agency."' For example, because the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") administers the laws governing the
issuance of patents (but not enforcement),'72 a court might allow it
to permissively intervene for the specific purpose of addressing an
issue relating to patent validity. Similarly, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), both
of which administer the antitrust laws,"' might be able to
permissively intervene to address an antitrust claim raised in a
patent case.
As shown by these examples, the scope of permissive
intervention may be limited to narrow subject areas, which may
hamper the ability of a neutral litigant to fully represent the public
interest-and exert a collateral moderating effect on the parties-
throughout the case across a range of issues: procedural matters,
patent liability issues, and remedies. A further wrinkle in the
utility of permissive intervention is that, although an intervenor
16s FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
169 Id. at 24(b)(1)(A).
O Id. at 24(b)(1)(B).
"' Id. at 24(b)(2).
172 General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/generalinfoconceming-patents.
jsp# heading-6 (2011) ("The USPTO administers the patent laws as they relate
to the granting of patents for inventions . . . . The USPTO has no jurisdiction
over questions of infringement and the enforcement of patents.").
'7 About the Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/about.shtm (2013) ("The Federal Trade Commission's
Bureau of Competition enforces the nation's antitrust laws . . . ."); Mission, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.
html ("The mission of the Antitrust Division is to promote economic
competition through enforcing and providing guidance on antitrust laws and
principles.").
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may continue to litigate through appeal even if the original parties
settle,"1 4 the intervenor must have Article III standing in order to do
so."' Such post-settlement litigation is unlikely to be an option for
a neutral litigant who has been granted permissive intervention, as
it may have difficulty satisfying the Article III standing
requirement.
As an alternative to intervention, the "litigating amicus" device
may be suitable for allowing a neutral litigant to substantively
participate in all aspects of a patent case."' Unlike a regular
amicus, whose participation in a case is generally limited to
briefing or oral argument directed to a discrete issue,"' a litigating
amicus substantively participates in the litigation itself, including
174 For a neutral litigant who represents the public interest, the ability to
continue litigation after the parties settle may be useful in the context of "reverse
payments" or "pay-for-delay" settlements in pharmaceutical patent litigation,
where a patentee settles a case by paying the generics manufacturer to withdraw
its suit challenging patent validity. See generally FTC Resources for Reporters:
Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/competition/payfordelay.shtml (last
visited July 23, 2012) (compiling FTC news releases, reports, and various
documents on pay-for-delay issue). Another context where post-settlement
litigation may be useful is where the district court grants the parties' joint
motion to vacate a non-defective ruling holding a patent invalid, unenforceable,
or not infringed in order to facilitate settlement. See generally Jeremy W. Bock,
An Empirical Study of Certain Settlement Related Motions for Vacatur in Patent
Cases, 88 IND. L. J. 919 (2013) (providing empirical analysis of district courts
granting settlement-related vacatur of decisions adverse to patentees).
1s See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) ("[A]n intervenor's right
to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was
permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the
requirements of Art. III.").
176 Amicus participation is often deemed a fallback position to intervention.
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 6-24 supra note 137, § 24.23[2] ("Participation as an
amicus curiae, rather than as a party, is appropriate if a person cares about the
legal principles that apply to a dispute but has no personal, legally protectable
interest in the litigation.").
177 See Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When
Does the Party Begin after the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1243, 1245
n.13 (1992) (noting "the traditional roles of brief writing and occasional oral
argument" of amicus curiae).
284 [VOL.15: 233
Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases
discovery, motion practice, and trial."' Unlike an intervenor,
however, a litigating amicus is unable to appeal from any
judgments, and may be dismissed at any time if the court decides
that the amicus is no longer necessary."' As with a regular amicus,
the decision to allow litigating amicus participation is committed
to the discretion of the district court.s0
The best-known uses of the litigating amicus device occurred
in the 1970s and 1980s in highly complex public law cases, such as
civil rights litigation.'"' In those cases, the litigating amicus was
often a government entity that had an institutional interest 8 2 in
participating in the case and had expertise that could assist the
178 See id. at 1246 (collecting cases and noting that "some federal district
courts have permitted the amicus to actively engage in oral argument, to
introduce physical evidence, to examine witnesses, to conduct discovery, and
even to enforce previous court decisions upon party-participants to the
litigation").
179 See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Amicus Curiae § 11 (2013) ("An amicus curiae has no
right to except to the rulings of the court; and if he or she takes such exceptions,
they cannot avail on appeal."); John B. Oakley, The United States as Participant
in Public Law Litigation: Recent Developments, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 247,
257 (1980) ("Once intervention is granted, the judge has no more control over
the positions taken by the intervenors than over those of the original parties.
This is in sharp contrast to the litigating amicus, who serves at the sufferance of
the judge and who has no appeal as of right should the judge err.").
o80 See 4 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 179, § 1 ("Although no specific rule permits
amicus participation in the trial court, there is no rule prohibiting it, and there is
no reason a trial judge should not have discretion to permit such participation if
it may be helpful to the court."); cf Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686
(S.D. Ohio 1992) ("Because the privilege of being heard amicus rests solely
within the discretion of the court, it necessarily follows that the scope of the
amicus participation must also be discretionary." (citation omitted)).
181 Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal
Court: A Fine Balance ofAccess, Efficiency, andAdversarialism, 27 REv. LITIG.
669, 679 & n.51 (2008); Lowman, supra note 177, at 1266 (collecting cases).
182 The governmental amici were not necessarily neutral in every case. For
example, the DOJ participated in some cases as litigating amici on the side of
the plaintiff. See Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional
Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2024 (1999) ("In total,
prior to 1980, the Department of Justice was either plaintiff, plaintiff-intervenor,
or amicus (almost always 'litigating amicus,' participating in discovery,
negotiation, and presentation of evidence) in more than ten of the largest and
most comprehensive prison cases . . . and in a number of jail cases.").
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court in evaluating the impact of a decision on the public at
large.' In some instances, district courts have even ordered the
government to participate as a litigating amicus.'84 Although
private individuals and organizations have also served as litigating
amici, their involvement has been criticized as leaving the case
vulnerable to manipulation by a non-party who may attempt to
control the litigation in furtherance of its own agenda.'
With the possible exception of government amici in complex
public law cases, the litigating amicus device is generally viewed
183 Simard, supra note 181, at 679 n.51; Lowman, supra note 177, at 1261-62.
184 See, e.g., In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he [district]
court ordered the United States to appear in the case as amicus curiae '[imn order
to investigate fully the facts alleged in the prisoners' complaints, to participate
in such civil action with the full rights of a party thereto, and to advise [the]
court at all stages of the proceedings as to any action deemed appropriate by
it.' " (third and fourth alterations in original)); Oakley, supra note 179, at 255
("A number of courts faced with massive public law litigation, threatening to
exhaust the resources of the original litigants, have permitted, requested and
sometimes ordered, the United States to appear as a 'litigating amicus
curiae.' "); cf Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575,
581 (1946) ("[A] federal court can always call on law officers of the United
States to serve as amici.").
185 See United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 166 (6th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter the Michigan Prisons Case] (characterizing group of private
litigants who were granted litigating amicus status as "an intruder with equal
litigating rights of a named party/real party in interest, thereby subverting the
right of the [named parties] to effectively control the future course of the
proceedings"). Perhaps because of the severity of the abuses associated with the
private group that had been granted litigating amicus status by the district court,
the Sixth Circuit in the Michigan Prisons Case condemned the litigating amicus
device in broad, general terms, without distinguishing governmental litigating
amici from nongovernmental, private entities. The Michigan Prisons Case is
distinguishable where the litigating amicus is a government entity whose
expertise is being offered to assist the court without any attempt to take control
of the litigation from the named parties. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Hanan, 868 F. Supp.
1356, 1360 (M.D. Ala. 1994) ("Unlike in the Michigan [Prisons] case, this court
is not presented with a situation where the amicus curiae is attempting to gain
control of the litigation or to prevent its speedy disposition. Rather, the
resumption of the federal government's participation in this litigation [as a
litigating amicus] will be greatly beneficial to all parties and the court."); see
also Lowman, supra note 177, at 1280 ("[U]nlike a governmental party, private
parties may have their own agenda, unattached to broad policy goals normally
coupled with governmental amici.").
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by district courts as unhelpful: According to one survey conducted
in 2007, "89% of District Court respondents indicated that
litigating amici are a hindrance or a neutral consideration in
litigation."'86 This result may be a reflection of the fact that the
typical amicus represents partisan interests,' such that judges may
be reluctant to confer full litigating privileges, lest the partisan
amicus hijack the litigation or unnecessarily complicate or prolong
the case in pursuing its own agenda. In addition, for the vast
majority of cases on a district judge's docket, the potential benefits
of having a litigating amicus may not necessarily outweigh the
associated administrative costs.'88
Indeed, where district courts have used litigating amici in the
past, it tended to be in highly complex cases that had strong public
interest consequences,' in which the participation of the litigating
amici would likely provide a net benefit. For this reason, litigating
amici may be particularly suitable for patent cases given their
complexity'9 0 and the public interest inherent in the fair, accurate,
efficient, and just resolution of the dispute."'
B. Choice ofNeutral Litigant
As discussed in the preceding section, the most viable path for
introducing a neutral litigant into a patent case may be through the
litigating amicus device, where the litigating amicus is a
government entity whose purpose in participating in the case is to
provide the court with a disinterested analysis of the merits that is
informed by its participation in discovery, its impartial evaluation
of the facts and the law, and its assessment of the public interest.
186 Simard, supra note 181, at 694.
'8 See id. at 676 ("Over time, amici curiae evolved into third party
representatives, less concerned with providing unbiased scholarly guidance to
the court and more interested in protecting the interests of individuals or entities
who were not named parties in a suit.").
'8 For a discussion of the administrative costs of the litigating amicus, see
infra Part IV.C.
189 See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Some may argue, however, that the neutral litigant function
could be assumed by a special master whose duties are extended to
include active participation in discovery and motion practice. This
is a suboptimal arrangement because an individual special master
does not have the resources of a government agency to participate
effectively in all aspects of the litigation for the full duration of the
case, which could be several years. Furthermore, because of the
level of participation required, a special master-who is
compensated by the parties pursuant to a court order or from funds
controlled by the courtl 92-may be hindered in his ability to take
on additional engagements. As a result, the economic interests of
the special master may leave him vulnerable to influence by the
parties or the court, so as to adversely affect the manner in which
he executes his duties as a neutral litigant who is charged with
representing the public interest.
More generally, private entities, including public interest
groups, may be poor choices for a neutral litigant.' For example,
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"),'94 the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"),'" and
Public Knowledge 96 are likely to align themselves with the
accused infringer throughout the case, rather than providing an
impartial, disinterested analysis of the merits. As discussed
previously, the collateral moderating effect is unlikely to exist if
the neutral litigant is perceived as having an agenda that is strongly
aligned with or against one of the parties.'
Given the concerns with private entities, the neutral litigant
function may be best served by a government entity. Ideally, it
would be an existing agency whose mission would be furthered by
its participation in a patent case. The neutral litigant role may be
192 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(2).
' See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
1' AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/ (last visited Oct.
13, 2013).
19 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2013).
196 PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, http://publicknowledge.org/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2013).
197 See supra Part III.B.
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fulfilled by one or more staff members at the agency, such as an
attorney who has experience in patent litigation and a staff
economist who can assist with issues related to remedies. Because
impartiality is a critical trait of the neutral litigant,' the agency
should be insulated from, or at least be highly resistant to, pressure
from the legislative and executive branches, including other
agencies.
In view of the considerations listed above, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") may be the best choice among existing
government agencies to serve as a neutral litigant in district court
patent litigation. The FTC's interest and expertise in evaluating
the intersection between patent policy and the public interest are
well-documented. For exanple, the FTC issued authoritative reports
in 20031'9 and 2011200 analyzing innovation policy and providing
recommendations on the proper balance between patents and
competition, and, most recently, the FTC has announced its
intention to study the practices of patent assertion entities. 20 ' The
FTC also files amicus briefs and provides comments in high profile
patent cases.202 In addition, pursuant to its mandate to investigate
"unfair methods of competition" under Section 5 of the FTC
Act20 3-which may extend to activities beyond the reach of
198 See supra Part III.B.
'99 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
200 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
201 FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their Impact on
Innovation, Competition, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Sept. 27, 2013)
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/09/paestudy.shtm (press release announcing study
of patent assertion entities).
202 See Advocacy Filings by Subject: Intellectual Property, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/advocacy subject.shtm#iptg (last visited Oct.
7, 2013) (listing advocacy filings).
203 Section 5 of the FTC Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006), provides in
pertinent part:
§ 45. Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by
Commission
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antitrust law2 04-the FTC has investigated anticompetitive
practices involving patents. For example, the FTC has been
actively involved in suits205  challenging "reverse payment"
settlements in pharmaceutical patent cases. 206 It has also used its
Section 5 enforcement powers to investigate the patent holdup
problem in the standard-setting context.20 7 Based on the FTC's
willingness to study and investigate matters relating to the impact
of various patent enforcement activities on the public interest,
having the FTC serve as a neutral litigant may enhance its mission
by allowing it to participate directly in a broader set of patent
cases-such as those involving patent assertion entities (or "patent
(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices;
inapplicability to foreign trade
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations ... from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.
Id. Notably, the FTC's mandate under Section 5 bears some similarity to the
ITC's mandate under Section 337 to investigate "unfair methods of competition"
and "unfair acts" arising in the context of importation. Compare 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a) (2006) with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
204 See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1055, 1079 (2010) ("An expansive reading of Section 5 allows
the FTC to prohibit conduct that the DOJ cannot. It does so with language that
might take on non-economic justifications, as in prohibiting conduct that is
'unjust,' 'oppressive,' or 'immoral."'); see also Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of
"Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 235 (1980) (reviewing legislative
history).
205 See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1Ith Cir. 2005); FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No.
1:08-cv-00244 (D.D.C Feb. 13, 2008).
206 See supra note 174.
207 See, e.g., Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, 2008 WL
258308 (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008); Complaint, Union Oil Co. of Cal., File No.
011-0214, Docket No. 9305, 2003 WL 1190102 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003);
Complaint, Rambus Inc., File No. 011-0017, Docket No. 9302, 2002 WL
1436415 (F.T.C. June 18, 2002); Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
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trolls") 2 0s-that may benefit from its expertise but which might lie
beyond its enforcement powers under Section 5 or the antitrust
laws.
A possible objection to the FTC serving as a neutral litigant
might be that its presence could hinder discovery because one or
both parties may be concerned about producing confidential
information that could provide grounds for a future FTC
enforcement action. In view of these concerns, the court can
require the FTC to establish an ethical wall separating the staff
serving as neutral litigants from the staff responsible for
enforcement actions. Furthermore, as a neutral litigant, the FTC,
like the named parties, would be subject to a protective order that
would limit the FTC's use of any confidential information that was
produced during a given case for purposes of that litigation only.
Other than the FTC, the DOJ or the PTO could also potentially
serve as neutral litigants, but they are less preferable choices. Both
the DOJ and the PTO have personnel who are experienced in
litigating patent-related issues: The DOJ's commercial litigation
branch has an intellectual property section that defends the United
States government in patent cases, 209 and the PTO's Office of the
Solicitor defends decisions of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board in
federal court.210  However, the DOJ and the PTO may be more
susceptible to political influence than the FTC, which is an
independent agency.2 1' The DOJ, for example, changed its position
208 Cf J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Patent Trolls: Broad
Brush Definitions and Law Enforcement Ideas, Remarks Before the Newport
Summit on Antitrust & Economics 11-14 (May 31, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080531roschlecg.pdf (discussing potential
theories for bringing Section 5 actions against patent trolls and noting potential
difficulties).
209 Commercial Litigation Branch, Intellectual Property Section, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/civiUcommercial/intellectualc-ip.html (last
visited July 10, 2012).
210 Office of the Solicitor, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/solicitor/index.jsp (last visited July 10, 2012).
21 See Sokol, supra note 204, at 1074-75 ("Overall, the literature on agencies
suggests that independent agencies are better suited to dealing with both time
consistency and credible commitment problems. Such advantages exist because
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regarding the legality of reverse payments when the administration
changed: During the presidency of George W. Bush, the DOJ was
unwilling to join the FTC's position that "reverse payment"
settlements in pharmaceutical patent cases212 were presumptively
illegal, whereas early in the Obama administration, the DOJ
changed its position and aligned itself with the FTC.213 As for the
PTO, it has been accused of succumbing to lobbying efforts by the
Canadian government on behalf of BlackBerry@ maker Research
in Motion, Ltd. ("RIM") in its alleged special treatment of the
reexamination of NTP, Inc.'s patents that were found to have been
infringed by RIM.2 4
The ability of the neutral litigant to resist political pressure is
critical because the circumstances under which political
considerations might creep into the neutral litigant's work would
be in its analysis of close questions, novel issues,215 or public
interest considerations 2 16-which may be outcome-determinative in
some cases. Because the type of patent case for which a neutral
independent agencies are more insulated from political pressures and less likely
to succumb to the majoritarian impulse of unpopular decisions.").
212 See supra note 174.
213 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, The Flip Side of 'Reverse Payments,' A.B.A.
J. (Feb 1, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
the flip side of reversepayments (observing change in DOJ position on
reverse payments). The DOJ's change in position appears to have been a direct
result of an Obama appointee heading the Antitrust Division. Cf James J.
O'Connell, Second Bites and the Search for a Standard: The DOJ's Cipro Brief
24 ANTITRUST ABA 7, 8 (2010) ("[D]uring her confirmation hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Christine Varney-a former FTC commissioner
herself and President Obama's nominee to be Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the [DOJ] Antitrust Division-pledged to 'work with the Department
of Justice to align the Federal Trade Commission and the DOJ on the reverse
payment issue."' (citation omitted)).
214 Yuki Noguchi, Canada Lobbies for Maker of BlackBerry, WASH. POST
(Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/02/21/AR200602210171 lpf.html.
215 The recently-enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 112 Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), will likely raise many issues of statutory
interpretation over the next couple of decades.
216 For example, the traditional four-factor test for injunctions contains a
public interest factor. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
391 (2006).
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litigant is most needed will be the largest, most complex ones21
involving well-heeled parties who likely possess the resources not
only to engage in highly-contentious, protracted litigation, but also
to exert political pressure, it is critical that the neutral litigant be
insulated from political influence as much as possible in order to
preserve its impartiality-which, as discussed previously, is one of
the key traits that renders the neutral litigant's views persuasive to
the court and allows it to exert a moderating influence on the
parties' tendency to engage in hyper-contentious advocacy. 21 8
In addition, where a government agency serves as a neutral
litigant, the institutional responsibilities of that agency will likely
color its public interest analysis. For example, the DOJ's mission
is to advance the interests of the federal government,2 19 which
includes the enforcement and defense of duly-enacted federal laws
from legal challenges-including certain laws that may not fully
serve the public interest.2 20 In matters involving patents, the DOJ
will often coordinate its positions with the applicable "client"
agency,221 namely, the PTO,2 2 which is routinely listed as
217 See infra Part IV.C.
218 See supra Part Ill.B.
219 The DOJ's mission statement is as follows:
To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States
according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and
domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling
crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior;
and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all
Americans.
About DOJ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
220 For example, the DOJ defended the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which barred federal recognition of same-sex marriages, until 2011 when
President Barack Obama directed the DOJ to stop defending it in court. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON LITIGATION
INVOLVING THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11 -ag-222.html; Charlie Savage &
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at Al (providing analysis of DOJ's position and
president's order).
221 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of
Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 580-81 (2003)
("[T]he agency is a captive client; it cannot choose to use its own lawyers or
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co-counsel on the DOJ's amicus briefs (and vice versa) filed in
patent cases at the Federal Circuit and at the Supreme Court.2 23
The PTO, in turn, has "clients" of its own in the form of patent
owners and applicants,224 whose user fees completely fund its
operation. 225 Furthermore, the PTO has a "symbiotic" relationship
retain a different 'firm.' . . . DOJ's stance has generally been one of grudging
acknowledgment that the agencies have the primary policymaking
responsibilities.").
222 See The USPTO: Who We Are, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) ("The USPTO
advises the President of the United States, the Secretary of Commerce, and U.S.
Government agencies on intellectual property (IP) policy, protection, and
enforcement .... ).
223 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4040414; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct.
2238 (2011) (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 991991; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 08-1511,
1512, 1513, 1514, 1595), 2010 WL 3390234; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Respondent, Ariad Pharms.,
Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-128), 2009 WL
4832140.
A rare but notable divergence between the PTO and the DOJ occurred on the
issue of genes as patentable subject matter. See Andrew Pollack, Patent
Protection, Breached, N.Y. TIMES, at BI (Nov. 2, 2010) ("The patent office
appears to have opposed the position taken in the Justice Department's brief.
None of its lawyers were listed as authors.").
224 Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1133 (2003) ("[T]he PTO
appears to have developed an institutional culture that treats patentees as
'clients' to be served rather than as claimants who must present a case for being
entitled to a patent.").
225 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET 5 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/
stratplan/budget/fyl3pbr.pdf ("As a fully user-fee funded organization, the
USPTO is able to complete its mission with zero net discretionary spending and
at no cost to the taxpayer."); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai,
Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 314 (2007) ("[T]he problem of capture
arises with respect to the PTO ... . It is favorably disposed to patent holders.
Not only is the incentive system of individual examiners strongly tilted towards
granting patents, but the agency as a whole is funded by applicant fees.").
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with the patent bar.226  Accordingly, if the DOJ and/or the PTO
were to serve as the neutral litigant, the interests of their respective
"clients" may substantially influence 227 their positions in the case.
In contrast, the FTC, whose institutional responsibilities are
directed to protecting consumers and competition, 228 does not have
"client" agencies like the DOJ, or a user base whose fees fully fund
its operations like the PTO. As a result, at least compared to the
DOJ and the PTO, the FTC's public interest analysis in its role as a
neutral litigant may be less susceptible to undue influence from
other agencies or third parties.
Some may question the FTC's suitability as a neutral litigant
because they view the agency as being possibly biased against
226 Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., the former General Counsel of Eastman Kodak Co.,
described the "symbiotic" relationship between the PTO and patent attorneys as
follows:
There has long been a symbiotic relationship between the Patent Office
and those who practice before it, and those who litigate its results. Each
has depended on the other for their livelihoods. Historically the way it
worked was that the Patent Office would issue a few more patents each
year, which would require a few more patent applications, which would
require a few more patent attorneys and patent examiners, and on and
on and on. These steady increases in the numbers of patents and patent
applications, and the consequent growth in the need for more examiners
and more patent attorneys, assured job security and attractive incomes
for both, and also assured that neither had the slightest interest in
changing the system.
CECIL D. QUILLEN, JR., THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM: IS IT BROKE? AND WHO CAN
Fix IT IF IT Is?, at 17 (May 11, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/intelpropertycomments/quillenattachments/isitbrokewhocanfixit.pdf
(presenting remarks at the Spring Meeting of the Association of General
Counsel).
227 See generally Jonathan S. Masur, The PTO's Future. Reform or
Abolition?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 6-8 (2009) (describing how
PTO's "clients" have lobbied for or against the PTO on certain issues, such as
funding and rulemaking, and noting possible proxy war and factionalism among
"clients").
228 The FTC's mission statement is as follows: "To prevent business practices
that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance
informed consumer choice and public understanding of the competitive process;
and to accomplish this without unduly burdening legitimate business activity."
About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
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patentees, especially given its litigation against reverse payments229
and enforcement actions against companies that have abused the
standard setting process.230 Viewed fairly, however, these activities
reflect the FTC's interest in maintaining a balance between patent
law and competition pursuant to its mandate under the antitrust
laws and the FTC Act,231 rather than an institutional hostility
toward patentees. Moreover, many of the positions taken by the
FTC on patent-related issues are similar to those taken by the DOJ
and the PTO. Indeed, the FTC and the DOJ have collaborated on a
report analyzing the interface between antitrust and intellectual
property232 and have held a joint workshop on patent assertion
entities.233 In addition, all three agencies have recently taken
similar positions on the remedies appropriate for standards-essential
patents.234
C. Case Selection and Cost
In the 12-month period ending March 31, 2012, over 4,000
patent cases were filed in the federal district courts. 235 As such, it
would not be practicable for every district court patent case to
229 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 203 and 228 and accompanying text.
232 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/
P040101 PromotinginnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
233 Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, (Dec. 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/pae/.
234 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS, (Jan. 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf, with Motorola
Mobility LLC and Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120, (Jan. 3, 2013), 2013
WL 124100, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103
googlemotorolado.pdf.
235 U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-2, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES
COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MAR. 31, 2011 AND 2012 (2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialC
aseloadStatistics/2012/tables/CO2Marl2.pdf (noting that 4,446 patent cases were
filed).
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include a neutral litigant from a government agency. Accordingly,
whether a given patent case would merit participation by a neutral
litigant needs to be analyzed from a cost-justification standpoint.
Even the ITC, where only forty Section 337 investigations were
initiated in 2012,236 recently decided to assign an ITC staff attorney
to only a subset of the investigations (instead of every one of them)
in light of budget constraints.23 7
In selecting district court patent cases for neutral litigant
participation, one criterion may be the complexity of the case, as
measured by the number of parties, asserted patents, or related
cases involving the same patent. In such cases, having a neutral
litigant who participates in all aspects of the litigation would be
particularly useful in streamlining the number of issues that require
adjudication. 238 A supplemental or alternative criterion could be
the economic "footprint" of the case based on the size of the
potential market, including upstream markets (e.g., the accused
infringer's suppliers) and downstream markets (e.g., the accused
infringer's customers and end-users), that may be materially
affected by the outcome of the litigation. If a case has a large
economic footprint, such that the outcome may have substantial
effects on third parties, the highly-polarized arguments proffered
by the parties on contested issues may not be sufficient to ensure a
just outcome--or, at the very least, make it difficult for the court to
achieve it. In such circumstances, a neutral litigant who represents
the public interest may help enhance the court's ability to
adjudicate both accurately and fairly by providing a disinterested
analysis and highlighting public interest considerations where
appropriate.
More generally, having a threshold based on the complexity of
the case or its economic footprint (or both) is necessary because, in
accommodating a neutral litigant, various administrative costs may
be imposed on the court, the parties, and the government agency
serving as the neutral litigant. For the court, the administrative
236 See supra note 99.
237 See Davis, supra note 91. The effect of the decreased participation of the
ITC staff attorney on Section 337 actions may be evaluated in future research.
238 See supra Part Ill. B.
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cost would primarily take the form of reviewing an additional
brief-i.e., the neutral litigant's views and responses to the
parties-for each motion239 or required submission (e.g., claim
construction briefing). For the parties, the administrative costs
would take the form of responding to the neutral litigant's briefs,
responding to the neutral litigant's discovery requests that are not
duplicative of the opposing party's requests, and accommodating
the neutral litigant's schedule when scheduling depositions,
meetings, or hearings. For the government agency serving as the
neutral litigant, the administrative cost would be the commitment
of personnel to the neutral litigant role. In order to maintain the
impartiality and the independence of the neutral litigant, the
government agency that acts as the neutral litigant should not be
compensated by the court or the parties for undertaking that role.
For patent cases that meet the complexity and/or economic
footprint thresholds, the benefits associated with the neutral
litigant's disinterested analysis of the merits and the streamlining
of issues resulting from the collateral moderating effect240 are
expected to outweigh the associated administrative costs. For the
court, the amount of work involved in reviewing the extra briefs
filed by the neutral litigant would be offset by the decrease in the
aggregate number of motions filed by the parties, greater
selectivity in the issues raised in the motions that do get filed, and
more refined arguments presented by the parties in support of their
positions.24 1 In addition, the disinterested analysis provided by a
neutral litigant may enhance the district court's ability to
adjudicate accurately, thereby potentially increasing the chances of
an affirmance on appeal.242 For the parties, they would have the
239 Based on the Author's experiences in ITC litigation, if the neutral litigant
is modeled after the ITC staff attorney, it will rarely file motions, and most of its
substantive filings will be responses to the parties' submissions.
240 See supra Part III.B.
241 See id.supra Part III.B.
242 In assessing the impact of a neutral litigant on the accuracy of adjudication,
it may be helpful to consider the data from an empirical study of special masters
in district court patent cases, as both neutral litigants and special masters are
impartial and would have specialized expertise in patent litigation. According to
a study by Kesan and Ball for the Federal Judicial Center, "[t]he appeal rate
among cases in which special masters were employed was comparable to that of
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benefit of streamlined motion practice as well as fewer
unproductive fights over discovery, scheduling, and administrative
issues because of the collateral moderating effect. 243 Also, patent
litigators who are familiar with ITC practice should not have any
difficulty adapting to the presence of a neutral litigant who plays a
role in district court cases that is similar to that of the ITC staff
attorney in Section 337 actions. And for the government agency
acting as the neutral litigant, participating in only the most
complex, high-stakes matters allows the agency to be directly
involved in those cases that are likely to have a significant impact
on the development of the law.
Some may contend, however, that the presence of a neutral
litigant might aggravate the tensions between the parties and
increase the complexity of the case by pointing to child custody
litigation. There, a three-sided litigation environment created by
the participation of a guardian ad litem appointed by the court to
the total population of patent cases, as was the reversal rate," see KESAN &
BALL, supra note 132, at 12, but that in "complex" patent cases, which are
defined as those lasting longer than 1,000 days, id. at 10, "[t]he appeal rate
among cases in which special masters were employed was half that of other
complex patent cases" and "[t]he reversal rate [was] also lower for patent cases
with special masters when compared to the reversal rate for all complex patent
cases." Id. at 13.
A study also exists that compares the claim construction reversal rate between
the ITC and the district courts, which analyzes whether the specialized expertise
of the ITC ALJs and the participation of the ITC staff attorneys result in a lower
reversal rate than the generalist district courts. David L. Schwartz, Courting
Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent
Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1699, 1699 (2009). Although this study
found that the reversal rate was comparable, id. at 1716, Table II, it may not
necessarily be indicative of an apples-to-apples comparison, id. at 1720, from
which the impact of the ITC staff attorney on adjudication accuracy may be
conclusively determined. Rather, to evaluate whether the ITC staff attorney's
participation improves accuracy, it is necessary to compare ITC investigations
that involve an ITC staff attorney with those that do not. See supra text
accompanying notes 99-100.
243 See supra Part III.B.
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represent the "best interests of the child"2 " may, in some instances,
actually increase the contentiousness of the proceedings 245 if one or
both parents treat the guardian ad litem with suspicion246 or
outright hostility. 247
That the presence of a neutral litigant might exacerbate the
adversarial atmosphere in child custody cases, while having a
moderating effect in patent litigation at the ITC and in Supreme
Court practice,248 suggests that the beneficial effects of the neutral
litigant may be further limited to certain types of subject matter or
parties. Child custody disputes are one of the most emotionally-
charged matters handled by courts,249 and, in a large percentage of
them, at least one parent may not be represented by counsel. 25 0 The
244 See, e.g., Marcia M. Boumil et al., Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting
Guardian ad litem Practice, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 43-44 (2011) ("A
guardian ad litem ("GAL") is an individual appointed by the court to serve as an
independent advocate who promotes the best interests of minors, elders, and
legally incompetent persons in custody disputes, abuse and neglect cases,
guardianships, and other court proceedings. GALs generally have expertise as
lawyers, mental health professionals or both.").
245 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search for
Clear and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 183, 210 (2005)
("Recognizing that children's lawyers and guardians ad litem could easily
exacerbate the adversarial atmosphere as well as the cost of divorce litigation,
the AAML [American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers] recommends that
courts make specific findings in any case as to why an appointment is
appropriate.").
246 See, e.g., Mary Grams, Guardians Ad Litem and the Cycle of Domestic
Violence: How the Recommendations Turn, 22 LAW & INEQ. 105, 105 (2004)
("While judicial officials applaud the work done by guardians ad litem, many
parents and lawyers view guardians as biased spies who selectively report their
findings for rubber-stamping by an overworked judiciary.").
247 In some cases, guardians ad litem have been threatened with lawsuits or
even violence. See Boumil, supra note 244, at 77-78.
248 See supra Part III.A.
249 See, e.g., Viamonte v. Viamonte, 748 A.2d 493, 498 (Md. App. 2000)
("Child custody cases are among the most emotionally charged matters to come
before the trial court . . . .").
250 See Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest
Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in
Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 110 (2001) ("[T]he percentage of cases in
which one or both of the parties appears without a lawyer is significantly higher
in family law cases than in any other area of the law. . . . [A] California Bar
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emotionally-charged subject matter coupled with the high
incidence of pro se litigants may render child custody disputes a
highly volatile litigation environment where the presence of a
neutral litigant may not necessarily exert a salutary effect on the
overall level of contentiousness. In contrast, patent litigation-
whether in the ITC or in the district court-usually involves
business entities or organizations that are represented by counsel,25 '
and the subject matter is less emotionally-charged than family law,
such that the collateral moderating effect arising from the neutral
litigant's presence in ITC patent litigation is also likely to occur in
district court patent litigation.
V. GENERAL OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS
In the previous sections, various specific objections and
concerns were addressed as the context arose. There are, however,
three general objections and concerns directed to the concept of the
neutral litigant that are worth highlighting and addressing
separately: (1) ensuring the neutral litigant's neutrality; (2)
funding issues and resource constraints; and (3) the impact on the
adversary system.
Ensuring Neutrality. The ability of the neutral litigant to
remain impartial is a critical concern. There are several means for
minimizing the likelihood that the neutral litigant would somehow
become beholden to or unduly influenced by the court or the
parties, as well as mitigating any biases that the neutral litigant
may have. First, there would be no ex parte communications
between the court and the neutral litigant,25 2 in order to prevent the
neutral litigant from being unduly influenced by the court (or vice
Report based on 1991 and 1995 data indicated that at least one party appeared
without a lawyer in 67% of all domestic relations cases and in 40% of all child
custody cases.").
251 According to a study of "high-tech" patent suits filed between 2000-2008,
only 5% of the suits were initiated by individuals. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls,
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation ofHigh-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1600 & Table 3 (2009). Any individuals
who can afford to litigate a patent dispute are likely sophisticated enough to hire
counsel.
252 See supra Part III.B.
JAN. 2014] 301
N.C. J.L. & TECH
versa). Second, a government agency should serve as the neutral
litigant, instead of a private individual who will need to be
compensated by the court or the parties.253 In addition, public
interest groups may be unsuitable because they are likely to pursue
an agenda on intellectual property issues that may be strongly
aligned with or against one of the parties. 254 Third, the neutral
litigant would set forth its views and responses to the parties'
filings on an issue-by-issue basis (which is how the ITC staff
attorney provides its views to the ALJ). 255 For example, if there are
multiple claim terms requiring construction, the neutral litigant
would provide its views for each term, which may favor one party
on some terms, the other party on different terms, and neither party
on the remaining terms. Fourth, the government agency acting as
the neutral litigant will likely have an institutional interest in
cultivating a reputation for impartiality in order to enhance its
credibility with the court, which may help restrain or suppress any
partisan inclinations that the agency might exhibit otherwise. And
finally, if the neutral litigant participates in the case through the
litigating amicus device, the court has considerable discretion to
define the scope of the neutral litigant's activities and may even
dismiss the neutral litigant if its analysis appears to be biased and
thus insufficiently useful to the court to justify the administrative
costs associated with its participation in the case.256
Funding Issues and Resource Constraints. Another concern
relates to how this proposal would be funded. Because the
government agency that participates as a neutral litigant in a given
case will do so at its own expense, it is critical that the neutral
litigant be furnished by an agency that would have a strong interest
in participating in patent cases as a means of furthering its mission.
As discussed previously, one of the agencies that might be
particularly suitable is the FTC, which is actively involved in
litigation, research, and advocacy concerning patent-related issues
and the public interest.2 57 As such, the FTC's participation in
253 See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(g)(2).
254 See supra text accompanying notes 193-197.
255 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
257 See supra Part IV.B.
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select patent cases as a litigating amicus who provides a
disinterested analysis of the merits to vindicate the public interest
(i.e., the fair, accurate, and timely adjudication of patent disputes)
could fall within the scope of its existing activities (or be deemed a
logical extension thereof) for which it could plausibly seek
additional funding from Congress.
A related concern is whether a neutral litigant supplied by a
government agency might unduly limit its involvement in a case in
order to control expenses. In order for the neutral litigant to have a
beneficial impact on the dynamics of a given case, it is not
necessary for an agency to assign a large team of attorneys to a
case; a single attorney may be sufficient. Indeed, in those ITC
investigations with substantive OUII participation, only one ITC
staff attorney is typically assigned,2 58 and that ITC staff attorney
usually juggles several cases at once. In addition, it is not
necessary for the agency attorney who acts as the neutral litigant to
participate in every deposition, conduct full discovery on its own,
or provide an exhaustive analysis of every motion filed by the
parties. In discovery, for example, the agency attorney may
participate in, or simply attend, the most important depositions and
may elect to support certain motions to compel filed by the parties
rather than propound discovery on its own. In motion practice, the
neutral litigant's analysis need not "start from scratch," but rather
would focus on comparing and contrasting the parties' arguments,
and highlighting their respective strengths or weaknesses to the
court. The ITC staff attorneys generally operate at the level of
participation just described,259 and it has been sufficient to exert a
collateral moderating effect on the parties' strategies.260 Apart
from agency resource constraints, the assignment of a single
agency attorney to the case is preferable to a team because the
258 See LYON & PIEPMEIER, supra note 72, at 4 ("Although this process is
currently changing, the OUII typically assigns a staff attorney formally called
the commission investigative attorney (the Staff) to each case." (emphasis
added)).
259 The ITC staff attorney, as a single individual, must necessarily prioritize
the issues he seeks to substantively address in a given case. The Author has
observed this occurring in practice.
260 See supra Part III.A.
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former will focus on the most important issues as a matter of
necessity, while the latter might unnecessarily increase the volume
of litigation. An agency that seeks to implement a neutral litigant
program for district court patent cases may find it useful to consult
the ITC staff attorneys regarding their processes in order to design
a workflow that would allow a single attorney to effectively
participate in a complex patent case.
Impact on the Adversary System. Finally, some might object to
the concept of a neutral litigant on the grounds that it could
somehow undermine the adversary system. The proposal in this
Article is not intended to change the adversarial nature of
litigation, but rather to moderate its excesses. With the neutral
litigant, the parties are not restricted from advancing their preferred
theories of the case. Instead, the neutral litigant's participation
induces the parties to perceive a strategic need to better prioritize
the issues over which they will litigate-which is an activity that
the parties should be doing anyway. And to the extent that this
would be deemed "changing" the adversarial nature of litigation, it
should be considered an improvement of the existing system.26 '
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article illustrates how it may be possible to achieve
standalone public interest representation in district court patent
cases, and, at the same time, dampen the level of unnecessary
contentiousness that impairs effective judicial decision-making, by
using only a single entity: the neutral litigant. These dual benefits
occur because the latter is a collateral effect arising from the
261 See Schwarzer, supra note 36, at 710 ("The incentives of the adversary
system, for example, provide no effective check on costs. Unlike the British and
Canadian legal systems in which the losing party routinely pays the winner's
costs, including fees, the American system permits lawyers to impose costs on
their opponents as long as the clients are willing to pay."); cf Robert F.
Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 253, 265 (1985) ("[T]here is nothing sacrosanct about the adversarial
system. It is a mere instrument by which to achieve the just resolution of
disputes. If it can no longer fulfill that function effectively, it must be
modified.").
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neutral litigant's acts in support of the former. Because the court is
likely to give weight to the neutral litigant's disinterested analysis
of the merits, each party will perceive a strategic need to "pick its
battles" and cast its positions in the most credible light with the
neutral litigant, whose support or opposition may affect the
viability of a party's position before the court. Judges often make
the mistake of treating overly contentious attorneys as squabbling
children rather than as highly strategic entities. This Article shows
that the conventional methods courts use to control attorney
behavior, namely rules and sanctions, may not work nearly as well
as changing the litigation environment so as to induce the attorneys
to recalibrate their strategies.
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